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Garrison: "Children Are Not Second Class Citizens": Can Parents Stop Publi

“CHILDREN ARE NOT SECOND CLASS
CITIZENS”:1 CAN PARENTS STOP PUBLIC
SCHOOLS FROM TREATING THEIR
CHILDREN LIKE GUINEA PIGS?
I. INTRODUCTION
Dear Senator Grassley: I am writing you to express my
frustration with the present condition of our education
system . . . . 2
Imagine . . . an area surrounded by green lawns, sidewalks, and
rows of one indistinguishable house followed by another.3 In this
suburbia-like neighborhood live the Wilsons. The Wilsons are a
traditional, hardworking, middle-class family, who like many families,
have a mortgage, a white-picket fence, and a chocolate lab named
Gomer. Wendy and William, the Wilsons’ two children, attend the local
public schools in Happy Days School District. Wendy, age seven, is a
second-grader who is excited about learning multiplication tables and
writing in cursive, while her brother, William, age fifteen, is a tenthgrader who is worried about making it through geometry and passing
driver’s education. Mr. and Mrs. Wilson know their children need a
quality education to succeed in today’s competitive world. Therefore,
they chose to send Wendy and William to Happy Days believing the
school district would provide their children with the fundamentals
necessary to prepare them for a challenging future.
A month before the new school year began, Happy Days School
Board met with Hypnotic Research Institute (“Hypnotic”) to discuss the
potential distribution of a survey to its first through twelfth-graders.
Hypnotic prides itself in its surveys and promotes them as valuable
learning methods for a community to assess how its youth feel regarding
certain private topics. In fact, because Hypnotic believes in the necessity
of the surveys, it offers to pay Happy Days one million dollars for access
1
Merriken v. Cressman, 364 F. Supp. 913, 919 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (quoting Miller v. Gillis,
315 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Ill. 1969)). “Students are persons under the Constitution; they have
the same rights and enjoy the same privileges as adults. Children are not second-class
citizens. Protections of the Constitution are available to the newborn infant as to the most
responsible and venerable adult in the nation.” Id.
2
140 CONG. REC. 1220 (1994) (statement in a letter by Jane F. Ponn, concerned parent, to
Senator Grassley).
3
The following scenario is purely a fictional setting created by the author. Also, any
similarity to a real family is solely coincidental.
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to its schools. Eventually, the school board concedes, brushing off the
survey as harmless and concentrating on the much-needed funds it will
generate for the district, which will also look good on future voting
platforms.
The survey, focusing on sexual activity, drug use, and racist
outlooks, contains questions such as the following: (1) Do you think
about having sex?; (2) Do you not trust people because they might want
sex?; (3) How many times in the past week have you smoked pot?; and
(4) If you could eliminate an entire race, which would you choose?4
Despite the survey’s content, the school board decides not to inform their
students’ parents. As a result, all of the parents, including Mr. and Mrs.
Wilson, are unaware that their children are doing anything nonacademic
during class time.
On the day scheduled for administration, the survey is given to all
participating grades, including Wendy’s second grade class and
William’s tenth grade class. Consequently, instead of Wendy learning
the multiples of nine and William learning the Pythagorean Theorem,
each was told to answer personal questions about sex and drugs. In
addition, neither Wendy nor William was ever told that if he or she did
not want to participate in the survey, both could withdraw without
consequence. Yet, after the survey is completed, class time is wasted,
and the school district collects its check, Wendy and William, both
confused, confront their parents about the survey’s content; little Wendy
wants to know what sex really is, and William wants reassurance that he
is not an awful person for having to choose to eliminate his buddy’s race.
Upset by the survey’s content, Mr. and Mrs. Wilson believe they had
a right to know their children were going to be taking such a
controversial survey.5 More specifically, they are shocked that such a
survey could be distributed to their children without their consent. Mr.
and Mrs. Wilson agree that if the survey had covered a legitimate
4
Questions (1) and (2) were taken from example questions addressed in Fields v.
Palmdale School District, 271 F. Supp. 2d 1217 (C.D. Cal. 2003). Question (3) was composed
from questions asked in C.N. v. Ridgewood Board of Education, 146 F. Supp. 2d 528 (N.J.
2001). Question (4), modified minimally here, was given on a survey in 1992 in Bettendorf,
Iowa.
See Ellen Makkai, Schools Snoop for Scandal, WORLD NET DAILY, at
http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=26208, at 1 (last visited
July 24, 2004); see also 140 CONG. RECS. 846-01, 863 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1994).
5
See infra Part II.A-C. Part II.A focuses on the idea of parental rights and establishes
how that fundamental right developed through two seminal cases. Part II.C, on the other
hand, concentrates on the concept of freedom of intimate association, which provides
protection for the parent-child relationship.
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educational topic, such as mathematical achievement, neither would
have protested.6 However, because of the survey’s inappropriate
content, Mr. and Mrs. Wilson agree that if they had known of the
survey’s existence, they would have removed Wendy and William from
their respective classes. Now, both feel betrayed by the survey’s
distribution and want assurance that Happy Days will not subject
Wendy and William to another survey without first obtaining their
approval. What can Mr. and Mrs. Wilson do?7
First, imagine the year is 1975.8 In 1975, the federal government is
officially involved in public education; however, no specific federal
statute exists to aid Mr. and Mrs. Wilson in their dilemma.9 Therefore,
because there is no federal provision to assist Mr. and Mrs. Wilson,
Happy Days’ administration of the survey, without any parental consent
or notice, will go unpunished. Thus, in 1975, Mr. and Mrs. Wilson are
unable to do anything about the Hypnotic survey and cannot protect
Wendy and William from having to answer future questions on invasive
surveys.

6
This Note focuses solely on the types of surveys and/or testing that are considered
social, not academic. For the purposes of this discussion, social, invasive surveys are those
that cover such topics as the following: (1) political affiliations; (2) psychological problems
of the student or the student’s family; (3) sexual behavior or attitudes; (4) illegal or
demeaning behavior; (5) critical appraisals of close family relationships; (6) legally
recognized privileged or analogous relationships; (7) religious practices or affiliations; and
(8) family income. For more information on academic surveys in elementary and
secondary schools, see DOUGLAS A. ARCHBALD & FRED M. NEWMANN, BEYOND
STANDARDIZED TESTING: ASSESSING AUTHENTIC ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENT IN THE
SECONDARY SCHOOL (1988); DOUGLAS A. WRIGHT ET AL., ACADEMIC REQUIREMENTS AND
ACHIEVEMENT IN HIGH SCHOOLS (1982); CHILDREN UNDER PRESSURE; A COLLECTION OF
READINGS ABOUT SCHOLASTIC PRESSURE (Ronald C. Doll & Robert S. Fleming eds., 1966).
7
This hypothetical, as well as this Note, is only addressing specific, statutory action
that Mr. and Mrs. Wilson could take. Thus, any sort of constitutional action, such as a due
process claim or Free Exercise claim, will not be considered here. Also, only a federal
statute will be discussed, not any individual state statute.
8
The year 1975 was chosen because the statute being addressed in this Note, the
Protection of Pupil Rights Act, was enacted in 1978. Thus, any claims such as Mr. and Mrs.
Wilson’s, would have been void of any federal statutory relief. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232h (1982);
see also infra Part II.D.
9
In 1965, the federal government enacted the Elementary and Secondary Education
Act, thus becoming more involved in public education. See Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (1965); see also infra notes 104-06 and
accompanying text (discussing the Act).
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Now, imagine the year is 2005.10 By 2005, the Protection of Pupil
Rights Act (“PPRA”) has officially been created to assist parents who are
in Mr. and Mrs. Wilson’s situation. In fact, Mr. and Mrs. Wilson’s claim
qualifies under the PPRA’s parameters, yet the statute will provide them
with little relief. First, and foremost, Mr. and Mrs. Wilson will not be
able to seek relief through the courts because the PPRA does not permit
judicial assistance.11 Thus, Mr. and Mrs. Wilson are forced to either deal
directly with Happy Days or contact the federal government.
One option for Mr. and Mrs. Wilson would be to file a complaint
directly with Happy Days’ administration because the PPRA requires the
school district to provide written notice at the beginning of the school
year of any scheduled nonacademic survey.12 However, if Mr. and Mrs.
Wilson choose that option, Happy Days will likely respond by stating
that Hypnotic’s survey was only voluntary and that Wendy and William
were not “required” to participate.13 As a result, Hypnotic will argue
that since the survey was not “required,” the PPRA is inapplicable.14
This option, as a result, does not help Mr. and Mrs. Wilson obtain relief.
Alternatively, Mr. and Mrs. Wilson can file a complaint with the
Department of Education, alleging that Happy Days failed to notify them
of the survey as mandated by the PPRA.15 But, because the Department
has complete discretion in deciding whether or not to conduct an
investigation, their complaints will likely go unnoticed.16 Consequently,
Happy Days will not be punished for disregarding the PPRA’s
provisions.17 This option, like the option of filing directly with Happy
Days, does not help the Wilsons obtain relief. In the end, 2005 produces

10
The year 2005 was chosen because the PPRA was officially enacted in 1978,
promulgated in 1984, congressionally amended in both 1994 and 2001, and judicially
altered in 2002. See infra Part II.D for official enactment and the congressional amendments
and Part II.E for the judicial modification.
11
See infra Part III.A; see also Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002).
12
See infra Part II.D; see also 20 U.S.C.A. § 1232h(c)(2) (West Supp. 2004).
13
See infra Part III.B; see also 20 U.S.C.A. § 1232h(b).
14
See infra Part III.B.
15
See infra Part II.D-E.
16
See infra note 137 and accompanying text (discussing the Department’s procedures for
filing a complaint); see also infra note 138 and accompanying text (presenting statistics on
the number of complaints the Department has reviewed between 1978 and 1994).
17
For Happy Days to receive punishment, the Department of Education would have to
conclude that a violation had indeed occurred. Otherwise, there is nothing in the statute
reprimanding Happy Days’ failure to notify Mr. and Mrs. Wilson.
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the same result as 1975. Wendy and William are still unprotected, and
Mr. and Mrs. Wilson are still helpless.18
This Note will concentrate on the issue of parental rights, discussing
how both the legislative and judicial systems have treated the PPRA,
which focuses on school-aged children and nonacademic testing in the
classroom.19 Part II will begin by outlining the foundational roots of
parental rights, followed by a historical overview of social research in the
public school classroom.20 Next, Part II will address the freedom of
intimate association, focusing on the parent-child relationship, and how
by not allowing parents to consent to their child’s participation in
invasive research, that relationship is potentially jeopardized.21 Finally,
Part II will uncover the Congressional creation of the PPRA, its various
modifications over the past thirty years, and conclude with how the
judicial system has interpreted the statute’s meaning.22 Part III will
analyze the current status of the PPRA, identifying the statute’s
inapplicability in the judicial system, as well as its linguistic loopholes
and ineffective standard of enforcement.23 Part IV will present a
redrafting of the current PPRA, establishing a path for judicial relief,
eliminating the “required” loophole, and creating a more efficient form
of power within the statute.24

18
The primary difference between the years 1975 and 2005 is that in 2005 the PPRA
officially exists. Thus, Mr. and Mrs. Wilson are misled into believing relief will be
provided to them if they follow the procedural guidelines in the complaint process. See
infra Part III.
19
The USA Patriot Act of 2001 will not be discussed because it does not address the
statute focused on in this Note. For information concerning The Patriot Act, see Adrian
Arroyo, The USA Patriot Act and the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act:
Negatively Impacting Academic Institutions by Deterring Foreign Students from Studying in the
United States, 16 TRANSNAT’L LAW 411 (2003); Paige Norian, The Struggle to Keep Personal
Data Personal: Attempts to Reform Online Privacy and How Congress Should Respond, 52 CATH.
U. L. REV. 803 (2003); Rita Shulman, USA Patriot Act: Granting the U.S. Government the
Unprecedented Power to Circumvent American Civil Liberties in the Name of National Security, 80
U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 427 (2003).
20
See infra Part II.A-B.
21
See infra Part II.C.
22
See infra Part II.D-E.
23
See infra Part III.
24
See infra Part IV. A complete ban on nonacademic surveys in elementary schools is
not discussed here, which the author firmly believes Congress should consider. This type
of restriction would require the comparison of mature verses immature students and is
thus outside the scope of this Note. For a more in depth discussion on student’s maturity
levels, see JANICE GIBSON-CLINE, PSYCHOLOGY FOR THE CLASSROOM 46 (1967); LOIS COFFEY
MOSSMAN, PRINCIPLES OF TEACHING AND LEARNING IN THE ELEMENTARY SCHOOL 59 (1929);
GEORGE A. FARGO, BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION IN THE CLASSROOM 28 (1970).
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II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
Dear Senator Grassley: I am writing to express my intense
concern about the non-academic subjects, invasive
questionnaires, and psychological therapy being forced upon
students in our public schools without either the permission or
knowledge of parents - a subject in which, I believe, you are
also interested.25
For nearly a hundred years, the judicial system has acknowledged
that parents have a right to make decisions concerning their children’s
education.26 However, the courts consistently struggle with how to
balance the constant force between the state’s power and parental rights
regarding education.27 To address this concern, this Part will first outline
the beginnings of “parental rights” by addressing the seminal cases,
which memorialize that such a right truly exists.28 Second, this Part will
introduce the historical beginnings of social research in public schools,
followed by an overview of how that research usurps a parent’s right of
intimate association with his child.29 Third, this Part will uncover the
legislature’s enactment of the PPRA and how it has evolved over the past
thirty years.30 Finally, this Part will discuss the judicial system’s recent
treatment of the PPRA, concluding with the current, ambivalent state of
the statute.31
A. The Establishment of Parental Rights Through Judicial Interpretation
The United States Supreme Court first focused on the issue of
parental rights in the 1920s in two historic cases: Meyer v. Nebraska 32 and

25
140 CONG. REC. 1218 (1994) (statement in a letter by Susan L. Gabriel, concerned
parent, to Senator Grassley).
26
See Ralph D. Mawdsley, The Changing Face of Parents’ Rights, 2003 BYU EDUC. & L.J.
165.
27
See generally William G. Ross, The Contemporary Significance of Meyer and Pierce for
Parental Rights Issues Involving Education, 34 AKRON L. REV. 177 (2000). Ross maintains that
the relationship between government and parents is one that “has created recorded
controversy since Plato advocated the communal rearing of children.” Id.
28
See infra Part II.A.
29
See infra Part II.B-C.
30
See infra Part II.D.
31
See infra Part II.E.
32
262 U.S. 390 (1923). The issue presented to the Meyer Court was whether:
A state law forbidding, under penalty, the teaching in any private,
denominational, parochial or public school, of any modern language,
other than English, to any child who has not attained and successfully

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol39/iss1/6

Garrison: "Children Are Not Second Class Citizens": Can Parents Stop Publi

2004]

"Children Are Not Second Class Citizens"

153

Pierce v. Society of the Sisters.33 In those cases, the Court clearly
announced that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
protects the right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children.34
In 1923, the Supreme Court first analyzed the concept of parental
rights in Meyer v. Nebraska.35 In Meyer, an elementary school teacher was
charged with violating a state foreign language law when he taught a
student in the German language.36 The Supreme Court of Nebraska
affirmed the conviction, holding that the statute did not violate the
liberty interests of the teacher, which are guaranteed under the
Fourteenth Amendment, but instead was a valid exercise of the state’s
police power.37 The United States Supreme Court disagreed, however,
passed the eighth grade, invades the liberty guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment and exceeds the power of the State.
Id. at 300-01.
33
268 U.S. 510 (1925). The issue presented to the Pierce Court was whether “[The
Compulsory Education] Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control.” Id. at
534-35.
34
Ross, supra note 27, at 177. An in depth analysis of the constitutional issues created in
Meyer, Pierce, and their progeny, which established that parents have a right to direct the
upbringing and education of their children, is beyond the scope of this Note. For a more
thorough discussion involving the constitutional aspects of parental rights, see Susan
Tomaine, Comment, Troxel v. Granville: Protecting Fundamental Parental Rights While
Recognizing Changes in the American Family, 50 CATH. U. L. REV. 731 (2001) (examining the
common law history of parental rights); Ross, supra note 27 (discussing the importance of
Meyer and Pierce and how later cases have reaffirmed their principle); see also Bevis
Longstreth, Behavioral Research Using Students: A Privacy Issue for Schools, 76 SCH. REV. 1
(1968) (asserting a problem exists concerning students’ constitutional right to privacy and
researchers in public schools). But see Robert R. Sears, In Defense of Privacy, 76 SCH. REV. 23
(1968) (arguing that problems of privacy violations are exaggerated).
35
Meyer, 262 U.S. at 390. The Nebraska Supreme Court examined the factual evidence
which set out that the defendant, a parochial school teacher at Zion Evangelical Lutheran
Congregation, taught the German language to a ten-year-old pupil, who had not passed the
eighth grade. Meyer v. State, 187 N.W. 100, 101 (Neb. 1922). However, because the
teaching was about a book of biblical stories, written in the German language, “the
defendant argue[ed] that in teaching the German language in this book he was giving
religious instruction according to the faith of the Zion Evangelical Lutheran Congregation.”
Id.
36
Meyer, 262 U.S. at 396. The Nebraska statute provided that no person in any type of
public or private school could teach in any language other than English to a student who
had not successfully completed the eighth grade without being charged with a
misdemeanor. Id. at 395. This law, which was similar to laws in twenty-one other states,
had at the time been attacked unsuccessfully in two other states as well, Ohio and Iowa. Id.
In the previously adjudicated attempts, the statute had been “upheld and sustained as
against all constitutional objections.” Id.
37
Id. at 397. The Court declared that “the police power itself is an attribute of
sovereignty. It exists without any reservation in the Constitution. It is founded on the
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asserting that the state cannot freely exercise its police power without
first balancing an individual’s right of liberty against the state’s right to
control, regardless of the reasonableness in its regulations.38
In the Supreme Court’s analysis, it discussed the due process liberty
clause in two respects: the teacher’s liberty interest to teach his students
and the parent’s liberty interest to choose that teacher to instruct his
children.39 Although the Court could not define the liberty guarantee
“with exactness,” Justice McReynolds declared that an individual’s right
of liberty includes the freedom “to acquire useful knowledge, to marry,
establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the
dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges
long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men.”40 The Court recognized that corresponding
with this liberty guarantee is the idea that parents have a natural duty to
guide their children’s education.41 Thus, in light of the Court’s
determination that both the teacher, as well as the parents, have a strong
liberty interest vested in the Fourteenth Amendment, it held the state’s
regulation unreasonable.42 Accordingly, Meyer’s acknowledgment of
right of the State to protect its citizens, to provide for their welfare and progress and to
insure the good of society.” Id. at 395. The Supreme Court of Nebraska reasoned that the
state had a legitimate interest in protecting its citizens against “the baneful effects of
permitting foreigners who had taken residence in this country, to rear and educate their
children in the language of their native land.” David Fisher, Note, Parental Rights and the
Right to Intimate Association, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 399, 402 (1997) (citing Meyer, 262 U.S. at 39798).
38
Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399. Justice McReynolds wrote:
[T]his liberty may not be interfered with, under the guise of protecting
the public interest, by legislative action which is arbitrary or without
reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the
State to effect. Determination by the legislature of what constitutes
proper exercise of police power is not final or conclusive but is subject
to supervision by the courts.
Id. at 399-400 (citing Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894)).
39
Id. at 400. Specifically, the Court stated, “[The teacher’s] right to teach and the right of
parents to engage him so to instruct their children, we think, are within the liberty of the
Amendment.” Id.
40
Id. at 399 (emphasis added).
41
See id. at 391. “In finding the state’s ends invalid, the Court compared the statute to
Plato’s theory that the state should entirely usurp the parent’s role, providing common
guardianship, such that ‘no parent is to know his own child . . . .’” Fisher, supra note 37, at
403 (citing Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401) (alteration in original). The Court stressed, nonetheless,
that social models such as Plato’s child-rearing theory “had been rejected by [the]
American society and the Constitution.” Id.
42
Fisher, supra note 37; see also Jennifer L. Sabourin, Note, Parental Rights Amendments:
Will a Statutory Right to Parent Force Children to “‘Shed Their Constitutional Rights’ at the
Schoolhouse Door?” 44 WAYNE L. REV. 1899 (1999). Although Meyer establishes that parents
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parental rights was the first indication that the Constitution does not
permit the government to interfere with a parent’s right to make
decisions regarding the upbringing and education of his children.43
The Court revisited parental rights two years later in Pierce v. Society
of the Sisters.44 The Pierce Court reviewed an Oregon statute, which
required parents to send their children between the ages of eight and
sixteen to a public school.45 The Supreme Court followed Meyer’s
reasoning and announced the state statute unconstitutional because its
enactment was unreasonable and not a legitimate exercise of the state’s
police power.46 Justice McReynolds, again writing for the Court, cited to
the “doctrine of Meyer,” reiterating the idea that there exists a “liberty of
parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of
children under their control.”47
The Court continued the Meyer
reasoning by stressing that “[t]he child is not the mere creature of the
State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right,
coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional
obligations.”48 Pierce thus reinforced the Meyer principle, holding that a
parent’s right to guide the upbringing of his children cannot be abridged
have certain rights when it involves their children, the Court has also acknowledged that
parents’ rights are not absolute, nor unlimited. Donald C. Hubin, Parental Rights and Due
Process, 1 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 123, 126 (1999). For example, a parent does not have a right to
abuse his or her child. Id. (analyzing parental rights as “fiduciary rights”).
43
Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
44
268 U.S. 510 (1925).
45
Id. at 530. The statute required that all parents and legal guardians who had children
between the ages of eight and sixteen send their children to a public school or be charged
with multiple misdemeanors for each day the child was absent. Id.
46
Id. at 510. In reviewing the historical presence of religious schooling in the United
States, the Court focused on the judicial system’s solemn duty to objectively review the
reasonableness of the state’s police power. Id. This power, the Court argued, must be used
to prevent the government from enacting such legislation that has the blatant purpose of
destroying the Nation’s private schools. Id. The Pierce Court concluded that the Oregon
statute was “so unusual and extraordinary,” it must give way to the freedom of parents to
choose what is best for his or her child. Id. at 515; see also Ross, supra note 27, at 178
(asserting that the law was enacted to minimize the effect of Catholicism in the country).
47
Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35 (emphasis added). After the Court readdressed the Meyer
principle, it concluded that the state’s reasoning to force all children into public schools
was unjustified, and thus did not give way to the fundamental theory of liberty. Id.
48
Id. at 535 (emphasis added). The Court recognized that “the statute in the suit
trespasses, not only upon the liberty of the parents individually, but upon their liberty
collectively as well.” Id. at 519. In effect, Pierce recognized that the state was imposing on
the rights of parents to support private and parochial schools by sending their children to
obtain such education and religious training. Id.; see also Ross, supra note 27, at 178
(declaring that if the law had been upheld, it would have been the demise of the Nation’s
public schools because no parent would send their child to both public and private schools
concurrently).
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by the state’s unreasonable legislation.49 As a result, these two historical
cases created what inevitably became identified as “parental rights.”50
Both Meyer and Pierce stand for the same principle: that parents
have a Constitutional right to direct the upbringing and education of
their children.51 The dual opinions indicate that the Supreme Court
created a “fundamental right” for parents, who thus have a high duty to
guide their children’s future.52 This Meyer-Pierce principle has yet to
diminish and is, in fact, as strong as it was eighty years ago.53 Therefore,
this principle should encourage parents to be proactive and to defend
their rights against any unjustified interference by the government when
the focus concerns their child’s best interests.
Within decades of the Supreme Court’s Meyer-Pierce decision,
parental rights again faced challenges.54 However, the threat was not
because of the state’s enactment of “rights-restricting” legislation, but as
Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535.
The Court decided both Meyer and Pierce during the peak of the Supreme Court’s use
of economic due process. Ross, supra note 27, at 182. After 1937, the Court abandoned the
argument of economic due process; however, it began honoring the concept of personal
liberties under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause. Id. at 179. Thus, even though
the Supreme Court has altered its analysis of parental rights, those rights are still as
prevalent as they were in the 1920s. Id. at 180.
51
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 399 (1923); Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35. When analyzing
both Meyer and Pierce, the Court never expressly declares the type of right it bestows on
parents. See Fisher, supra note 37, at 404. However, subsequent cases have treated the right
granted as one of fundamental value. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000)
(plurality opinion) (asserting that “the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control
of their children . . . is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by
this Court”).
52
See generally Fisher, supra note 37, at 404. Fisher’s article asserts that in both Meyer and
Pierce the opinions are shy about classifying the right delegated as fundamental. Id.
Nevertheless, he adds, Justice McReynolds’ comment in Meyer that “the individual has
certain fundamental rights which must be respected,” implies the protection of a greater
right. Id. (citing Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401). For more information regarding the dispute of
parental rights as fundamental verses non-fundamental, see Raymond C. O’Brien, An
Analysis of Realistic Due Process Rights of Children Versus Parents, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1209
(1994) (arguing that the right established is a fundamental right). But see James G. Dwyer,
Parents’ Religion and Children’s Welfare: Debunking the Doctrine of Parents’ Rights, 82 CALIF. L.
REV. 1371 (1994) (arguing that the right established is not a fundamental right).
53
See Fisher, supra note 37, at 404. Fisher concludes that the due process analysis the
Court used in both Meyer and Pierce was of the same as the courts use today. Id. He
reasons that at the beginning of the century, the Court was not concerned with categorizing
due process rights as either “just plain” liberty rights or “fundamental” rights. Id. As a
result, Fisher deduces that regardless of the Court’s lack of categorization, “the Court in
Meyer and Pierce clearly engaged in what would today be considered heightened scrutiny
of government objectives despite using ‘rational basis’ language.” Id. at 404-05.
54
See infra Part II.B.
49
50
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a result of social psychologists wanting direct access to children.55
Consequently, with this pressing desire to research children,
psychologists soon realized the possibilities of testing students while in
their public school classrooms.56 Thus, researchers and schools alike
subtly began challenging parental rights, arguing that they are in a better
position to make decisions for children while those children are in their
custody.57
B. The Historical Background of Research in Public Schools
The Supreme Court’s opinions in both Meyer and Pierce established
the principle that parents have a right to direct the upbringing of their
children.58 This right, the Court declared, is guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment and is not to be trumped by a state’s
unreasonable enactment of legislation.59 However, only a few years after
Pierce and Meyer were decided did parental rights again become
threatened.60 Yet, the rising threat was not from the state’s creation of
arbitrary legislation, but the result of social researchers entering public
schools.61 In fact, beginning in the 1950s, researchers in the area of
school psychology began recognizing the possibilities of a classroom as
an experimental arena.62

See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.B; see also Frances A. Mullen, The School as a Psychological Laboratory, 14
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 53, 54 (1959) (asserting the possibilities of using public school
classrooms as experimental laboratories).
57
See Troxel v. Grandville, 530 U.S. 57, 57 (2000) (plurality opinion). With schools
wanting to override a parent’s right to guide the upbringing of their children, the school
districts had to defeat the “presumption that fit parents act in their children’s best
interests.” Id. at 58.
58
See supra Part II.A; see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 399 (1923); Pierce v. Soc’y of
the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
59
See supra Part II.A; see also notes 35-50 and accompanying text.
60
Mullen, supra note 56, at 54. “Training in the school setting has gone on since the
1930’s when Andrew Brown taught the child clinical courses in the Department of
Psychology at the University of Chicago and used both the public schools and the Institute
of Juvenile Research as his laboratory.” Id. (focusing on the “barriers” inhibiting the
transition of public schools into laboratories). Mullen argued that psychologists were
discouraged by public school research; however, she believed that schools had
“tremendous potential . . . as a laboratory for research and training in almost all phases of
psychological study . . . .” Id. at 56. Based on that perception, she concluded her article by
encouraging researchers to seek out public schools for their psychological needs. Id.
61
Id. at 56.
62
Id. To illustrate the abundance of research being conducted on children, between 1958
and 1959, approximately 162 articles appeared in psychology journals reporting the use of
children as subjects. See Alfred Castaneda & Leila S. Fahel, The Relationship Between the
55
56
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Since the mid-twentieth century, psychologists interested in
examining children as experimental subjects realized the potential data
that could be obtained from observing and testing children in one of
their “natural settings.”63 Additionally, the American public school
system began opening its doors to researchers wanting to perform
various psychological studies on their students.64 In fact, in as early as
1959, a Chicago public school administrator wrote an article in the
American Psychologist encouraging school psychologists to research
students during school hours.65 The administrator enhanced the article
by accentuating “the exciting possibilities” of such work and
emphasized the “boundless laboratory opportunities” in the school
setting.66 As a result of this and similar articles, the experimentation
process subtly progressed, creating new problems for parents who
wanted to protect the best interests of their children.67
In 1959, one of the first controversial student testings occurred in the
public schools in Houston, Texas.68 Five thousand ninth graders were
asked to complete six “socio-psychometrics” tests, which contained such
questions as:
Psychological Investigator and the Public Schools, 16 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 201, 203 (1962). The
162 articles discussed were found in non-child specific journals, thus excluding all of the
articles appearing in journals almost exclusively devoted to child-related research. Id.
63
Anne M. Dellinger, Experimentation in the Classroom: Use of Public School Students as
Research Subjects, 12 J.L. & EDUC. 347, 349 (1983).
64
Id.; see also Robert E. Clasen et al., Access to Do Research in Public Schools, 38 J.
EXPERIMENTAL EDUC. 16 (1969). Mr. Clasen and his colleagues claimed that administrators
base their decisions on whether or not to allow psychologists access to their schools by
considering the importance of the research, the impact it will have on the school district’s
routine curriculum, how much the community is involved, and how much the district will
financially gain from the survey’s distribution. Clasen, supra, at 16.
65
Dellinger, supra note 63, at 349. The number of school psychologists employed by the
Chicago public school system increased from sixty-six in 1957 to ninety in 1958. Mullen,
supra note 56, at 54. And, one-third of those twenty-four “psychologists,” newly employed,
were not professionals with an official certificate to work as a school psychologist, which
only requires “two years of supervised clinical experience with children.” Id. However,
because the demand was so high for researchers, those approximately eight individuals in
Chicago’s public schools were issued temporary certificates to work in the schools. Id.
66
Dellinger, supra note 63, at 349 (quoting Mullen, supra note 56, at 55).
67
Id. By the 1960’s, psychology departments at large universities across the country
were establishing connections between their faculty researchers and the public schools
located in there same geographical area. Id. But see Marcia Guttentag, Research Is Possible:
New Answers to Old Objections, 6 J. SCH. PSYCHOLOGY 254 (1968) (discussing the difficulties
that school psychologists encountered when approaching the idea of research in schools).
68
Gwynn Nettler, Test Burning in Texas, 14 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 682 (1959). The research
program in Houston, which had begun in 1955, was sponsored by the Rip Van Winkle
Foundation. See Leonard D. Eron & Leopold O. Walder, Test Burning II, 16 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 237 (1962).
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I enjoy soaking in the bathtub.
A girl who gets into trouble on a date has no one to
blame but herself.
If you don’t drink in our gang, they make you feel like a
sissy.
Sometimes I tell dirty jokes when I would rather not.
Dad always seems to [sic] busy to pal around with me.69
After the survey’s distribution, the Houston school board ordered
that the answer sheets be burned because parents felt the questions
concerning the students’ perception of themselves, their families, their
peers, and their teachers were inappropriate.70
Despite many complaints made by parents, researchers were taking
full advantage of this new laboratory.71 In addition, public schools in
general were reacting positively to this new attention.72 For example, in
1969, ninety-six Wisconsin school superintendents were questioned on
how they felt concerning experiments in the classroom.73
Each
superintendent agreed that his district was not only willing to grant
school psychologists access to their schools, but each believed that the
district had an obligation to do so for the good of the research.74 In fact,
only two of the superintendents polled could remember ever denying a
request from an outside researcher.75 Thus, as a result of the willingness
of public schools to provide researchers direct access to their students,
many minor children were transformed into experimentation subjects.76

69
Nettler, supra note 68, at 682. A majority of the Houston school board members
agreed with the parents’ concerns that the questions were fashioned in such a way they did
not benefit the children but potentially undermined their moral character. Id.
70
Id.
71
Dellinger, supra note 63, at 349.
72
Id.; see also Castaneda & Fahel, supra note 62, at 201-03 (focusing on the willingness of
administrators to allow researchers access to their public schools).
73
Dellinger, supra note 63, at 349. In addition to the Wisconsin poll, at a national
convention of the American Educational Researchers Association, only three of sixty-six
researchers reported being refused the opportunity to conduct research in schools. See
Clasen, supra note 64, at 19.
74
Dellinger, supra note 63, at 349.
75
Id.
76
See Phyllis Schlafly, Symposium, The Public School System as an Instrument of Power, 77
CORNELL L. REV. 1000 (1992) [hereinafter Schlafly, Symposium]. Ms. Schlafly boldly
asserted in her article that:
Minor children are forced to disclose all sorts of things that we would
not allow the police department to force arrested suspects to disclose.
Children are required to reveal incriminating information about
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As the research continued into the 1960s and 1970s, school
psychologists grew aware of the unique problems with studying
children in their classroom environment.77 For instance, psychologists
recognized potential invasion of privacy issues raised in using a human
for experimentation.78
However, these concerns did not deter
researchers from taking advantage of the public school classroom and
minor children.79 Consequently, because researchers were failing to
obtain parental consent before testing each student, the privacy issues
inherent in the parent-child relationship, through the freedom of
intimate association, were facing serious abuse.80
C. How Research in Public Schools Affects Parental Rights Through Intimate
Association
In the 1920s, the Supreme Court recognized in both Meyer and Pierce
that parents have a fundamental right to guide the upbringing of their
children.81 Since then, the Court has further defined the parental role to
include the right “to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and
control of their children.”82 Despite the Supreme Court’s affirmation of
parental rights, public schools across the Nation began challenging those
themselves and their families . . . . Children in the classroom are
forced to read materials, which the parents consider pornographic,
profane, immoral, and anti-religious. The American people would
never stand for any government bureau or any court forcing adults to
submit to these types of violations, but these violations are committed
on minor children in the public school classroom every day.
Id. at 1001.
77
See Clasen, supra note 64, at 16.
78
Id. Clasen described the psychologists’ recognitions as an “increasing concern for care
in the treatment of human subjects in experimentation” as well as “the issue of the invasion
of the right to privacy.” Id.
79
See generally Dellinger, supra note 63, at 349.
80
See Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 624-25 (1980)
(arguing that intimate association is found in the “zone of privacy” created in the First,
Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments). Mr. Karst’s article, which is regarded as one of the
seminal articles discussing associational rights, criticizes the Supreme Court’s reluctance in
calling the right to privacy of married persons an intimate association. Id. at 625; see also
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see also Paul D. Fredrick, The 1978 Hatch
Amendment: Attempted Applications Are Failing to Protect Pupil Rights, 19 IND. L. REV. 589, 594
(1986).
81
See supra Part II.A.
82
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 57 (2000) (plurality opinion). In Troxel, the Court
stated that “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause has a substantive
component that ‘provides heightened protection against government interference with
certain fundamental rights,’ including parents’ fundamental right to make decisions
concerning the care, custody, and control of their children . . . .” Id. (quoting Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997)).
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rights by turning students over to school psychologists, suggesting that
the administrators have the right “to make decisions concerning the
care” of students while in the school’s custody.83 However, by schools
making these decisions, and therefore injecting themselves “into the
private realm of the family,” they potentially violate what the Court had
repeatedly declared—that fit parents have the Constitutional right to
decide what is in their child’s best interests.84 Thus, according to Meyer,
Pierce, and their progeny, a public school that administers social surveys
to its students without first receiving the consent of parents potentially
infringes the intrinsic privacy rights imbedded in the parent-child
relationship under the concept of freedom of intimate association.85
The freedom of intimate association rests on the theory that certain
human relationships are so united through their beliefs, morals, and
values that they should be afforded the highest level of protection from
unreasonable interference by the State.86 This freedom, which exists in
See supra Part II.B; see also Dellinger, supra note 63, at 349.
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 58; see also Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720 (stating that “[i]n a long line of
cases, we have held that, in addition to the specific freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights,
the ‘liberty’ specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes the righ[t] . . . to direct
the education and upbringing of one’s children”) (citations omitted); Santosky v. Kramer,
455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (stating that there is a “fundamental liberty interest of natural
parents in the care, custody, and management of their child”); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584,
602 (1979) (“Our jurisprudence historically has reflected Western civilization concepts of
the family as a unit with broad parental authority over minor children. Our cases have
consistently followed that course.”); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (“We have
recognized on numerous occasions that the relationship between parent and child is
constitutionally protected.”); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (“It is plain that the
interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her
children ‘come[s] to this Court with a momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made
to liberties which derive merely from shifting economic arrangements.’”) (citations
omitted); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (“The history and culture of Western
civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of
their children. This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now
established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition.”).
85
See Karst, supra note 80, at 625. The Supreme Court has declared that a right of
association exists and derives from the cases concerning “marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education.” Troxel, 530 U.S. at 58
(citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976)). Karst asserts that one reason why the
freedom of intimate association is a separate and distinct category, and not just combined
to fit within the “zone of privacy” is because of the Supreme Court’s “revival of substantive
due process as a guarantee of individual freedoms” in the 1970s. See Karst, supra note 80, at
626 (arguing that the Court’s opinion in Griswold shaped the beginnings of intimate
association even though it omitted articulating those rights as such, instead categorizing
them as privacy rights).
86
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984). The Roberts Court declared that these
relationships “have played a critical role in the culture and traditions of the Nation by
83
84
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the core of the due process clause, can be defined as “a close and familiar
personal relationship with another that is in some significant way
comparable to a marriage or family relationship.”87 This freedom, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly declared, is necessary to provide a
constitutional shield for those intimate associations that are bonded
through their common kinship.88 Thus, as the Court has openly
recognized, this unique association deserves the right to be free from
unwarranted state interference.89 Included in these associations is the
relationship between a parent and a child.90
The freedom of intimate association is not absolute.91 It does not
demand that the government refrain from advancing its “majoritarian
views” at all times.92 Instead, the freedom demands that a state set forth
serious justifications before it significantly impairs the values found
within intimate associations.93 Thus, before the state substitutes its views
of morality into these associations, including a parent-child relationship,
it must have a compelling justification for doing so.94 As a result, this
cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs; they thereby foster diversity and act
as critical buffers between the individual and the power of the State.” Id. at 618-19.
87
Karst, supra note 80, at 629. Karst recognized that the inherent uniqueness of intimate
associations is the joining of individuals who once had separate and distinct lives but unite
together as one being. Id.
88
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619 (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-86 (1978); Moore
v. E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232 (1972); Griswold, 381 U.S.
at 482-85).
89
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619 (citing Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255; Smith v. Org. of Foster
Families, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977); Carey v. Population Serv. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-86
(1977); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974); Stanley, 405 U.S. at
651; Stanley v. Georgia. 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,
478 (1928)).
90
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619. See Fredrick, supra note 80, at 426-33. The Roberts Court stated
that “[f]amily relationships, by their nature, involve deep attachments and commitments to
the necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares not only a special community
of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs, but also distinctively personal aspects of one’s life.”
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619-20.
91
Karst, supra note 80, at 627. Karst argues that the freedom of intimate association is
like other freedoms imbedded in the Constitution and carries with it a presumptive value,
not an absolute value. Id.
92
Id. Karst states that “[t]he freedom does not imply that the state is wholly disabled
from promoting majoritarian views of morality.” Id.
93
Id. Karst continues by stressing that the relationships deserving the protection of
intimate association, such as marriage and familial relationships, are held by the courts as
“fundamental freedoms” and are treated as other fundamental rights found within the
Constitution. Id.; see also Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619.
94
Karst, supra note 80, at 627. If a state attempts to significantly hinder a person’s
fundamental right, it must have a compelling justification to pass strict scrutiny analysis.
Id. at 627-28; see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (determining that when a state
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freedom stands for the principle that because a liberty interest is
embedded in the constitutional foundations of the due process clause,
intimate associations deserve the respect of the government, which
should consequently defer to the parent’s right to guide his child’s
upbringing.95
The theory of intimate association premises on the Meyer-Pierce
principle: Because such a sacred relation binds the parent-child
relationship, the government should not take away the parent’s
fundamental right to direct the upbringing of his children.96
Nevertheless, the threat of violating that freedom did not discourage
social psychologists from entering public schools; however, the
increasing use of children as research subjects encouraged the federal
legislature to begin evaluating the role of parental rights.97 By the midtwentieth century, parents were not only having their rights challenged
by state officials, but with Congress now attentive to the social testing
occurring in the Nation’s public schools, the federal government began
testing parental rights as well.98
D. Legislative Solutions to Public School Research
By the 1950s, the idea of parental rights, as first acknowledged by
Meyer and Pierce, was being challenged as school psychologists
recognized the endless possibility of testing students in their natural
environment: the classroom.99 In addition to this recognition, public
schools were encouraging researchers to take advantage of their
students’ accessibility.100 Because of the growing connection between
restricts a person’s freedom to marry it must pass strict scrutiny because that freedom is a
fundamental right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434
U.S. 374, 388 (1978) (“When a statutory classification significantly interferes with the
exercise of a fundamental right, it cannot be upheld unless it is supported by sufficiently
important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those interests.”).
95
See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 57 (2000); see also Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619.
96
See Fredrick, supra note 80, at 426. Fredrick asserts that “the Supreme Court has
consistently referred to the need for government to respect familial boundaries and the
position of parents.” Id. However, despite the Supreme Court’s declaration, it has never
defined the limits of those boundaries. Id. Consequently, lower courts are split on how far
that respect extends. Id.; see Brown v. Hot, Sexy, and Safer Prod., Inc., 68 F. 3d 525, 532-35
(1st Cir. 1995); Halderman v. Pennhurst St. Sch. and Hosp., 707 F. 2d 702, 708 (3d Cir. 1983);
Medeiros v. Kiyosaki, 478 P. 2d 314, 319 (Haw. 1970); People v. Bennett, 501 N.W. 2d 106,
111-12 (Mich. 1993).
97
See infra Part II.D.
98
See infra Part II.D.
99
See supra Part II.B-C.
100
See supra Part II.B.
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researchers and public schools, Congress, in the 1960s, considered
regulating the relationship.101 Consequently, in 1962, Representative
John Ashbrook of Ohio introduced one of the first bills focusing on a
parent’s right to know when his or her child is part of a research
experiment in the classroom.102 The bill, however, was not passed.103
Notwithstanding the denial of Ashbrook’s bill, Congress enacted the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act (“ESEA”) in 1965.104 The
ESEA, which was referred by the Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare, was established “to strengthen and improve educational quality
and educational opportunities in the Nation’s elementary and secondary
schools.”105 However, the ESEA did not directly focus on research in
public schools.106 In 1966, another bill was therefore introduced focusing
specifically on federally funded research.107 That bill, presented by
Representative Benjamin S. Rosenthal of New York, forced public
schools to first get parental consent before administering certain invasive
tests on their students.108 Again, however, Congress denied the bill.109
Dellinger, supra note 63, at 350.
Fredrick, supra note 80, at 593. Representative John Ashbrook “introduced a bill
requiring parental knowledge of, and consent for, their children’s participation in federally
funded research relating to students’ personalities, home life, family relationships, sexual
behaviors, and religious beliefs.” Id.
103
Id.
104
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (1965).
With the passage of the ESEA, the federal government became more involved in public
school financing. See Stafford Smiley, The Elementary and Secondary Education Amendments
of 1974: The Effect of the Consolidation and Review Provisions Upon the Distribution of
Decisionmaking Authority, 12 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 447, 447 (1975).
105
SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY
EDUCATION ACT OF 1965, S. REP. NO. 89-146, at 29 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1446, 1448. On April 1, 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson announced the purpose of this
legislation by stating, “This bill has a simple purpose: To improve the education of young
Americans. It will help them master the mysteries of their world - enrich their minds - and
learn the skills of work. And these tools can open the world to them.” Id.
106
See Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27
(1965). The ESEA “expired on June 30, 1973, subject to an automatic one-year extension
provided by the General Education Provisions Act (GEPA).” Smiley, supra note 104, at 453
(citations omitted).
107
See H.R. 14288, 89th Cong. (2nd Sess. 1966). The premise of Rosenthal’s bill was
similar to that of Ashbrook’s in that he “would have prohibited the use of federal funds to
support research involving the administration of ‘personality inventory’ tests, unless the
tests were taken voluntarily and . . . with the prior informed consent of a parent or guardian.”
Dellinger, supra note 63, at 350 (emphasis added).
108
Id. Rosenthal introduced his bill, in part, because of his disgust with the surveys. Id.
Rosenthal provided his colleagues with one example where the New York City Board of
Education had permitted researchers, operating under a grant from the National Institutes
of Mental Health, to administer the Minneapolis Multiphasic Personality Inventory to 350
101
102
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Nonetheless, Rosenthal’s bill and its subcommittee report converted into
very useful statistics for Congress, warning of the imminent problem of
public school research.110 Nevertheless, another eight years passed
before Congress transcribed an amendment affecting students and their
privacy rights.111
In 1974, Representative Jack Kemp of New York presented an
amendment to the General Education Provisions Act (“GEPA”).112 This
amendment obligated schools to make available to parents, who
requested, any newly produced instructional materials that were going
to be issued to their children.113 As part of the GEPA’s amendments,
Senator James Lane Buckley presented an amendment that would shield
parents and students from nonacademic testing in the classroom.114 Like
ninth graders without seeking parental consent. Id. In fact, after the survey was completed
and a parent contacted the school, the assistant principal responded that, “parents ‘simply
have to trust the judgment of the educators.’” Longstreth, supra note 34, at 1. Some of the
questions the parents thought were inappropriate and objected to asked, True or False: (1)
I am very strongly attracted by members of my own sex; (2) Sexual things disgust me; (3) I
like movie love scenes; (4) I have never indulged in any unusual sex practices; (5) Many of
my dreams are about sex matters; and (6) There is something wrong with my sex organs.
Dellinger, supra note 63, at 350 n.13.
109
Fredrick, supra note 80, at 594.
110
Dellinger, supra note 63, at 351-52. Due to the congressional subcommittee report,
“[l]egislators questioned the value of many of the studies, particularly those with
questionnaires examining the student’s self-image, family relationships, sexual experience,
religious views, personal values, and facts about the student’s parents.” Fredrick, supra
note 80, at 594. The subcommittee suggested that parents be allowed the opportunity to
examine questionnaires before their children participate in any program. Id.
111
Fredrick, supra note 80, at 594.
112
See 20 U.S.C. § 1232h (1976). This amendment, which became effective on August 21,
1974, was titled the Pupil rights, protection; inspection by parents or guardians of instructional
material; research or experimentation program or project. The amendment was defined as:
All instructional material, including teacher’s manuals, films, tapes, or
other supplementary instructional material which will be used in
connection with any research or experimentation program or project
shall be available for inspection by the parents or guardians of the
children engaged in such program or project. For the purpose of this
section “research or experimentation program or project” means any
program or project in any applicable program designed to explore or
develop new or unproven teaching methods or techniques.
Id. This amendment eventually became subsection (a) of the PPRA. Compare 20 U.S.C.
§ 1232h(a) (1982) with 20 U.S.C.A. § 1232h(a) (West Supp. 2004).
113
120 CONG. REC. 8,505 (1974). Specifically, the amendment required schools that
receive federal funds to make available to parents any instructional material that was to be
used in a program or project designed to explore new teaching methods. Fredrick, supra
note 80, at 594-95.
114
Fredrick, supra note 80, at 594 n.49. Senator Buckley stressed that the fundamental
reason for his introducing the amendment was to reaffirm his basic belief that parents have

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2004

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 39, No. 1 [2004], Art. 6

166

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

his predecessors, Representatives Ashbrook and Rosenthal, Senator
Buckley was motivated by the overwhelming use of surveys being
administered to elementary and secondary students.115 However, when
the 1976 Education Amendments were signed into law, the legislature
had reformatted the provisions, departing from Senator Buckley’s
intention.116 In fact, Congress dropped the section compelling schools to
obtain parental consent before subjecting students to testing.117 Thus,

a basic right and responsibility for the welfare and the development of their children. 121
CONG. REC. 13,991 (1975).
115
Fredrick, supra note 80, at 594. Senator Buckley gave the following explanation for the
genesis of his bill in a speech to the Legislative Conference of the National Congress of
Parents and Teachers:
My initiation of this legislation rests on my belief that the protection of
individual privacy is essential to the continued existence of a free
society. There has been clear evidence of frequent, even systematic
violations of the privacy of students and parents by the schools
through the unauthorized collection of sensitive personal information
and the unauthorized, inappropriate release of personal data to
various individuals and organizations.
121 CONG. REC. 13,991; see also Margaret L. O’Donnell, FERPA: Only a Piece of the Privacy
Puzzle, 29 J.C. & U.L. 679 (2003) (outlining the history of FERPA).
116
O’Donnell, supra note 115, at 683-84. The section that was dismissed was defeated in
the Senate by two votes. 121 CONG. REC. 13,991. “That section would have required
parental consent before a child undergoes certain forms of testing or treatment, such as
psychiatric, or divulges sensitive personal or family information, or partakes in certain
behavior or value-changing courses or activities.” Id. However, with regard to the
amendment that did pass, it was done so without the customary committee discussion and
debate. Id. Consequently, not much exists in the records regarding its legislative history.
See D. Martin Warf, Note, Loose Lips Won’t Sink Ships: Federal Education Rights To Privacy Act
After Gonzaga v. Doe, 25 CAMPBELL L. REV. 201 (2003) (stating that because little legislative
history exists regarding the the PPRA’s sister statute, courts have had difficulty
determining Congress’ intentions).
117
121 CONG. REC. 13,991. More precisely, Congress eliminated the section requiring
“parental consent before a child undergoes certain forms of testing or treatment, . . .
divulges sensitive personal or family information, or partakes in certain behavior or valuechanging courses or activities.” Id. Senator Buckley pleaded with his colleagues by
asserting that “[m]any schools do not ask parents’ permission to give personality or
psychiatric tests to their children, or to obtain data from the children on their parents and
family life. Some of these tests include questions dealing with the most personal feelings
and habits of children and their families.” Id. Buckley continued by discussing how some
of the personally identifiable data obtained from the students is unknowingly given to
various government agencies and to private organizations. Id. One example Senator
Buckley presented to his colleagues demonstrated that “[a] year ago . . . a Federal office
demanded information on pupil and family ethnic attitudes from over 100,000 [sic] New
York City’s elementary school pupils. Fortunately, the city board of education adamantly
refused, even in the face of a reported threat to cut off all federal education funds - over
$200 million a year - to the city.” Id.
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once again, Congress chose not to regulate the administration of public
school surveys.118
In 1978, Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah sponsored an amendment to
the 1974 GEPA amendment.119 That provision became known as the
Although Congress dropped the section regarding testing or treatment and parental
consent, Senator Buckley’s amendment passed and became known as the Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act (“FERPA”). 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (1976). FERPA stated, in
its original form:
(a) Conditions for availability of funds to educational agencies or
institutions; inspection and review of education records; specific
information to be made available; procedure for access to education
records; reasonableness of time for such access; hearings; written
explanations by parents; definitions;
(1)(A) No funds shall be made available under any applicable program
to any educational agency or institution which has a policy of denying,
or which effectively prevents, the parents of students who are or have
been in attendance at a school of such agency or at such institution, as
the case may be, the right to inspect and review the educational
records of their children. If any material or document in the education
record of a student includes information on more than one student, the
parents of one of such students shall have the right to inspect and
review only such part of such material or document as relates to such
student or to be informed of the specific information contained in such
part of such material. Each educational agency or institution shall
establish appropriate procedures for the granting of a request by
parents for access to the education records of their children within a
reasonable period of time, but in no case more than forty-five days
after the request has been made.
(3) For the purposes of this section the term “educational agency or
institution” means any public or private agency or institution which is
the recipient of funds under any applicable program.
(4)(A) For the purposes of this section, the term “education records”
means, . . . those records, files, documents, and other materials which (i) contain information directly related to a student; and
(ii) are maintained by an educational agency or institution
or by a person acting for such agency or institution.
20 U.S.C. § 1232g (1976); see 20 U.S.C. 1232g (2000) (showing FERPA in its current form); see
also John E. Theuman, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA) (20 U.S.C.A. § 1232G), 112 A.L.R. FED. 1
(1993) (discussing and analyzing the formation of FERPA).
119
HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. AND LABOR, EDUCATION AMENDMENTS OF 1978, H.R. NO. 951137, at 1 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4971. Senator Hatch as well as Senators
Bartlett, Garn, McClure, Wallop, and Zorinsky proposed the amendment. 124 CONG. REC.
27,423 (1978). Senator Hatch believed in the purpose of the amendment and expressed that
belief on the floor of the Senate by stating, “our amendment requires that before any
elementary or secondary age child is subjected to psychiatric, behavior probing or other
nonscholastic and nonaptitude testing; that there must first be obtained the written consent
of the respective child’s parent or guardian.” Id. at 27,423; see also Phyllis Schlafly, How
Public School Curriculum Has Changed!, 35 EAGLE FORUM 8 (2002), available at
118
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Hatch Amendment, or the Protection of Pupil Rights Act (“PPRA”).120
The PPRA, which Senator Hatch commonly referred to as the “parental
consent amendment,” contained two subsections.121 In subsection (a),
the amendment incorporated Representative Kemp’s 1974 amendment
requiring federally funded schools to make instructional materials
available to parents when the proposed program encompassed “new or
unproven teaching methods or techniques.”122 Subsection (b), in
contrast, provided new regulations regarding psychiatric and
psychological examinations, testing, or treatment.123
Specifically,
subsection (b) provided that if a school district wants to require a student
to participate in psychological testing where the primary purpose is to
force the student to reveal personal information about himself or his
family, such as his political affiliation, mental instabilities, sexual
behavior, financial situation, and/or illegal behavior, the school must
first obtain written parental consent.124 Senator Hatch’s act, as it was

http://www.eagleforum.org/psr/2002/mar02/psrmar02.shtml (Mar. 2002) [hereinafter
Schlafly, Changed!].
120
See 20 U.S.C. § 1232h (1982). The Hatch Amendment did not create any debate in
either sector of Congress. CHILD ABUSE IN THE CLASSROOM: EXCERPTS FROM OFFICIAL
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION 11 (Phyllis
Schlafly ed., 1985) (highlighting the personal testimonies of persons who attended the
seven hearings conducted by the U.S. Department of Education in March, 1984). In reality,
“[p]robably no Senator or Congressman thought that anybody could object to providing
schoolchildren with this mantle of protection against such classroom abuse of their
personal rights or family privacy.” Id.
121
See 20 U.S.C. § 1232h (1982); see also 124 CONG. REC. 27,423 (1978).
122
20 U.S.C. § 1232h(a). Congress simply moved the 1974 Kemp provision, which
focuses on parental access to instructional materials, to subsection (a) of the Hatch
Amendment. 20 U.S.C. § 1232h(a); see supra note 112 (illustrating subsection (a)).
123
20 U.S.C. § 1232h(b).
124
Id. Specifically, subsection (b) provided:
No student shall be required, as part of any applicable program, to
submit to psychiatric examination, testing, or treatment, or
psychological examination, testing, or treatment, in which the primary
purpose is to reveal information concerning:
(1) political affiliations;
(2) mental and psychological problems potentially
embarrassing to the student or his family;
(3) sex behavior and attitudes;
(4) illegal, anti-social, self-incriminating and demeaning
behavior;
(5) critical appraisals of other individuals with whom
respondents have close family relationships;
(6) legally
recognized
privileged
and
analogous
relationships, such as those of lawyers, physicians, and
ministers; or
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intended, shaped the foundation for greater parental rights in public
schools, and thus created the basis for the PPRA’s present form.125
The PPRA, however, was not readily accepted by some, and
therefore, was not initially acknowledged.126 Specifically, persons in
opposition of the PPRA argued that testing was “necessary for
community schools . . . to collect firsthand views of teens about their
sexual attitudes and behavior; the availability of drugs and firearms;
problem behavior among students; their parents’ attitudes and family
history of problem behavior and conflicts.”127 In contrast, the PPRA’s

(7)

income (other than that required by law to determine
eligibility for participation in a program or for receiving
financial assistance under such program) without the
prior consent of the student (if the student is an adult or
emancipated minor), or in the case of unemancipated
minor, without the prior written consent of the parent.

Id.
125
See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1232h (West Supp. 2004) (showing the current provisions of the
PPRA).
126
Fredrick, supra note 80, at 590-91. Opponents of the amendment consisted of a diverse
range of established education groups, scientific organizations, and civil rights activists,
including in part, “American Civil Liberties Union, American Association of School
Administrators, National Parent Teachers Association, American Association of Colleges of
Teachers Education Association for the Advancement of Psychology, Council for Education
and Development, Federation of Behavioral Psychological and Cognitive Science, National
Association of School Psychologists, and People for the American Way.” Id. at 591 n.22.
They argued that the regulations limited academic freedom and chilled the educational
system’s ability to remain an unrestricted arena for the “marketplace of ideas.” Id.;
Comments, What Will We Tell the Children? A Discussion of Current Judicial Opinion on the
Scope of Ideas Acceptable for Presentation in Primary and Secondary Education, 56 TULANE L.
REV. 960, 963 (1982) [hereinafter Comment, Children]. In 1919, Justice Holmes first
introduced his theory of the “marketplace of ideas.” Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,
630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). In Abrams, Justice Holmes very famously announced
that “the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas . . . the best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market
. . . .” Id. Under the marketplace theory, “the child is presented with objective conceptions
of divergent viewpoints and theories, and thereby given the opportunity to determine for
himself, with appropriate parental guidance, the validity of the various positions.”
Comment, Children, supra, at 963. However, one major argument against the school
environment as a “marketplace of ideas” is the contention that the idea of exposing
elementary-aged students to a variety of topics and ideas is inappropriate for their
maturity level, where secondary-aged students are more secure and stabilized to better
analyze the various viewpoints. Id. at 970.
127
George Archibald, Mrs. Ridge Promotes Survey on Sex, Drugs; Information Used to Gain
Grant, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2003, at A01, available at 2003 WL 7705978 (statement made by
Mr. Bete, president of Channing Bete Company, a Massachusetts firm that devises datagathering programs). The surveys are compiled to “‘look at protective factors and risk
factors’ and develop ‘a focused, long-range community action plan for building on existing
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proponents claimed that the regulations were needed to protect minor
children from “psychiatric meddling,” “psychological abuse,” and
“federal thought control,” as well as “prevent[ing] invasions into the
students’ personal and family matters.”128 Despite the assertions of the
statute’s opponents, the PPRA’s supporters pleaded for six years, and
the provisions were finally settled.129
In November 1984, after months of research and public hearings, the
Department of Education finalized regulations regarding the education
of school children and implemented the PPRA.130 Stated generally, the
resources [to develop] healthy beliefs, clear standards, and healthy behaviors for children
and youths.” Id.
128
See Fredrick, supra note 80, at 591; see also 124 CONG. REC. 27,423. Senator Hatch
believed that the non-academic testing was nothing more than “psychiatric probing” and
that researchers manipulated children through “mind-bending” surveys. 124 CONG. REC.
27, 423.
129
CHILD ABUSE IN THE CLASSROOM, supra note 120, at 11. The PPRA’s proponents
ranged from parents to “concerned citizen” groups including “the Eagle Forum, American
Education Coalition, National Council for Better Education, Maryland Coalition of
Concerned Parents for Privacy Rights in Public Schools, Guardians of Education for Maine,
The American Coalition for Traditional Values, and other pro-family organizations.”
Fredrick, supra note 80, at 590 n.15.
130
See 34 C.F.R. §§ 98.3-98.7 (2003); see also CHILD ABUSE IN THE CLASSROOM, supra note
120, at 16. Because the PPRA took six years before it received federal recognition, “[s]ome
Congressmen charged that the federal bureaucrats did not issue regulations because they
did not like the statute and did not intend to enforce it.” CHILD ABUSE IN THE CLASSROOM,
supra note 120, at 17. In fact, it was not until after substantial evidence was gathered by the
Department of Education, concerning possible violations, that it conducted seven days of
open hearings to receive comments from the public. Id. The seven hearings took place as
promised in March 1984, in Seattle, Pittsburgh, Kansas City, Phoenix, Concord, Orlando,
and Washington, D.C. Id. Across the country, “more than 1,300 pages of testimony were
recorded by court reporters as parents, public school teachers, and interested citizens
spelled out their eye-witness accounts of the psychological abuse of children in the public
schools.” Id. at 11. For example, one witness gave testimony about a survey that was
administered through a Guidance Counseling Program in Lincoln County, Oregon, that
students were forced to answer:
1. Do you have a close relationship with either your mother or father?
2. Have you taught a Sunday school class or otherwise taken an active
part in your church?
3. Do you believe in a God who answers prayers?
4. Do you believe that tithing - giving one-tenth of one’s earnings to
the church - is one’s duty to God?
5. Do you pray about your problems?
6. Do you read the Bible or other religious writings regularly?
7. Do you love your parents?
8. Do you believe God created man in His own image?
9. If you ask God for forgiveness, are your sins forgiven?
10. Have you ever had problems so bad you wished you could die so
you would not have to face them?
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1984 regulations employed both subsections of the Hatch Amendment
and authorized that the amendment’s scope include most programs
funded by the United States Department of Education.131 In addition, the
regulations included definitions for psychiatric and psychological
examination, testing, and treatment, and introduced the procedures for
filing a complaint.132

11. Would you rather live with someone else?
12. Would you like to have different parents?
13. What chores do you have at home on a regular basis?
14. What do you fear - real or imagined?
15. If you could change one thing in your home, or school, what
would you change and why?
16. Why did your parents get married?
17. Do your parents ever lie to you?
Id. at 29-30 (testimony of Archie Brooks). Even after the Hearings took place, the
Department of Education hesitated for six months before publishing the regulations in the
Federal Register on September 6, 1984. Id. at 20.
131
Fredrick, supra note 80, at 590; see 20 U.S.C. § 1232h(b) (Supp. 1985).
132
34 C.F.R. §§ 98.3-98.4, 98.7. Section 98.3 provides:
(a) All instructional material-including teachers’ manuals, films, tapes,
or other supplementary instructional material-which will be used in
connection with any research or experimentation program or project
shall be available for inspection by the parents or guardians of the
children engaged in such program or project.
(b) For the purpose of this part research or experimentation program
or project means any program or project in any program under § 98.1
(a) or (b) that is designed to explore or develop new or unproven
teaching methods or techniques.
(c) For the purpose of the section ‘children’ means persons not above
age 21 who are enrolled in a program under § 98.1 (a) or (b) not above
the elementary or secondary education level, as determined under
State law.
34 C.F.R. § 98.3 (emphasis omitted). Section 98.4 provides:
(a) No student shall be required, as part of any program specified in
§ 98.1 (a) or (b), to submit without prior consent to psychiatric
examination, testing, or treatment, or psychological examination,
testing, or treatment, in which the primary purpose is to reveal
information concerning one or more of the following:
(1) Political affiliations;
(2) Mental and psychological problems potentially embarrassing to the
student or his or her family;
(3) Sex behavior and attitudes;
(4) Illegal, anti-social, self-incriminating and demeaning behavior;
(5) Critical appraisals of other individuals with whom the student has
close family relationships;
(6) Legally recognized privileged and analogous relationships, such as
those of lawyers, physicians, and ministers; or
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In 1994, ten years after the Department of Education implemented
the Hatch Amendment, Congress again addressed its provisions.133 This
time the amendment was reviewed under the Goals 2000: Educate
America Act (“Goals 2000”).134 Senator Charles E. Grassley of Iowa,

(7) Income, other than that required by law to determine eligibility for
participation in a program or for receiving financial assistance under a
program.
(b) As used in paragraph (a) of this section, prior consent means:
(1) Prior consent of the student, if the student is an adult or
emancipated minor; or
(2) Prior written consent of the parent or guardian, if the student is an
unemancipated minor.
(c) As used in paragraph (a) of this section:
(1) Psychiatric or psychological examination or test means a method of
obtaining information, including a group activity, that is not directly
related to academic instruction and that is designed to elicit
information about attitudes, habits, traits, opinions, beliefs or feelings;
and
(2) Psychiatric or psychological treatment means an activity involving
the planned, systematic use of methods or techniques that are not
directly related to academic instruction and that is designed to affect
behavioral, emotional, or attitudinal characteristics of an individual or
group.
34 C.F.R. § 98.4 (emphasis omitted). Section 98.7 provides:
(a) Only a student or a parent or guardian of a student directly affected
by a violation under Section 439 of the Act may file a complaint under
this part. The complaint must be submitted in writing to the Office.
(b) The complaint filed under paragraph (a) of this section must(1) Contain specific allegations of fact giving reasonable cause to
believe that a violation of either § 98.3 or § 98.4 exists; and
(2) Include evidence of attempted resolution of the complaint at the
local level (and at the State level if a State complaint resolution process
exists), including the names of local and State officials contacted and
significant dates in the attempted resolution process.
(c) The Office investigates each complaint which the Office receives
that meets the requirements of this section to determine whether the
recipient or contractor failed to comply with the provisions of section
439 of the Act.
34 C.F.R §. 98.7.
133
20 U.S.C. § 1232h (1994).
134
HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. AND LABOR WELFARE, GOALS 2000: EDUCATE AMERICA ACT,
H. R. NO. 103-168, at 58 (1994), reprinted in 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. 63. This act was enacted on
March 31, 1994, and its primary purpose was stated:
To improve learning and teaching by providing a national framework
for education reform; to promote the research, consensus building, and
systematic changes needed to ensure equitable educational
opportunities and high levels of educational achievement for all
students; to provide a framework for reauthorization of all Federal
education programs; to promote the development and adoption of a
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believing that Congress had a duty to protect the constitutional rights of
parents in public schools, introduced the amendment as follows:
To prohibit the use of certain funds for activities related
to a student’s personal values, attitudes, beliefs, or
sexual behavior without certain consent, notification,
access to information, and an opportunity for a hearing,
to provide for enforcement of such prohibition, and to
require the Secretary of Education to designate or
establish an office and review board within the
Department of Education.135
Grassley emphasized the ineffectiveness of the Hatch Amendment,136
and how the regulations placed too heavy a burden on parents to
establish that a violation had occurred in his or her child’s school.137
voluntary national system of skill standards and certifications; and for
other purposes.
Id. The Protection of Pupil Rights amendment changed § 439 of the GEPA. See 20 U.S.C.
§ 1232h.
135
140 CONG REC. S 846-01, 864 (daily ed. Feb 4, 1994). Senator Grassley stressed the
importance of parental rights to his colleagues by asserting the practicality of those rights
and also the constitutionality behind those rights granted in Meyer and Pierce. Id. In fact,
Grassley stated, “Congress should protect [parental] rights as much as they protect the civil
rights of students access to the school door.” Id. at 857. Furthermore, he emphasized the
destruction of this country as a society “where dramatically fewer young children can read,
write, or count but who become worldly wise to stories about sex and drugs and violence.”
Id. at 856. Thus, as an advocate of parental rights, Grassley believed that the government
has an affirmative duty to protect children and their parents. Id.
136
Id. At the Goals 2000’s proceedings and debate, Senator Grassley underlined the
Hatch Amendment’s weaknesses. Id. Very simply, he concluded that the original 1978 act
was outdated. Id. More specifically, Grassley believed that Senator Hatch’s amendment
was efficient for its time, but because “a lot of bureaucratic red tape and regulations make
the Hatch amendment very ineffective,” the PPRA needs a facelift to refocus the original
intentions of the statute’s purpose. Id. at 856. Furthermore, Senator Grassley stressed to his
colleagues the necessity of abolishing the “psychiatric probing” taking place regularly in
elementary and secondary schools without the knowledge, much less the consent, of
parents or guardians. Id. He continued by demonstrating that Senator Hatch’s amendment
focused only on the idea of parental consent, and that it did not focus on the true
underlying problem of the nonacademic surveys—the need to eliminate. Id.
137
Id. Senator Grassley explained the primary problem of the 1978 statute as being a law
To illustrate,
that places too great a burden on parents. 140 CONG. REC. 1219 (1994).
Grassley reviewed the exact procedures and obstacles that parents must overcome to prove
a violation in their child’s school:
First, parents must prove that they attempted a resolution at the local
level. They must prove that the development and/or administration
of the program is supported by the U.S. Department of Education
funds. They must prove that the activity that they find offensive meets
the definition of a research or experimentation program or project
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Additionally, Senator Grassley proved the statute’s weakness by
illustrating that since the regulation’s promulgation in 1986, only
seventeen requests had avoided the statute’s loopholes to qualify for
federal investigation.138 In the end, Senator Grassley’s proposal was
accepted, and the PPRA was remodeled.139

under the regulations . . . . If the conditions appear to exist that are
spelled out in the law, then parents must get through each and every
one of the following hoops for the Family Compliance Office at the
Department of Education to investigate. Parents must prove that the
specific activity that they find offensive is funded with Department of
Education funds. They must prove that their child is directly affected
by the activity in question. They must prove that the activity meets the
definition of psychiatric or psychological testing or treatment in the
regulation. They must prove that the primary purpose of the activity
is to reveal private information protected under the act. They must
prove that the school has not received their written consent. They
must prove that they attempted to resolve the conflict at the
appropriate State and local levels before filing a complaint with the
Family Compliance Office at the Department of Education in
Washington.
Id.
140 CONG. REC. 1224 (1994). To illustrate the inconsistencies in the Department’s
policies and the amount of impermissible testing that occurs, Senator Grassley introduced a
number of surveys sent to him from concerned parents across America. See generally id. In
fact, Grassley submitted “letters from parents in Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, . . .
Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, Virginia, and Washington” asking for help. Id. at 863. One of the questionnaires
he submitted was titled Passive Child Abuse, and it had been distributed to a seventh grade
health class in Davenport, Iowa. Id. at 858-59. The children were told specifically not to
take a copy out of the classroom or to discuss the exercise with their parents. Id. One child
disobeyed the teacher and gave a copy to her mother. Id. The questionnaire read as
follows:
There are many ways to abuse children other than actively hitting,
pushing, pinching, and name-calling them. The following is a list of
ways in which children may be passively abused.
1. Allowing children to stay up late watching TV on school nights.
2. Failure to have children’s glasses fixed or teeth repaired.
3. Failure to have a will made or to designate a guardian for your
children.
4. Staying with a partner who is an active and abusive alcohol or drug
user.
5. Dating or living with someone who hates and is abusive to children.
6. Driving too fast, carelessly, or under the influence of alcohol or
drugs.
7. Not fastening children into automobile child restraints, seat belts,
and shoulder harnesses when driving.
8. Abusing alcohol or drugs or selling illegal drugs.
9. Being very critical of mate and talking against him or her to
children.

138
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Grassley’s revisions only minimally changed subsections (a) and (b)
of the original Hatch Amendment.140 However, his new amendment
introduced three new subsections: (1) regulating notice; (2) enforcement;
and (3) the requirements of an office and review board.141 Additionally,

10. Neglecting to fill out or sign children’s school forms.
11. Having no idea who your children’s friends are or where your
children hang out.
12. Sending children to school when ill or letting them fake illness to
avoid school.
13. Not providing clean clothes and a clean home.
14. Not having children immunized.
15. Never following through on punishments given to children.
16. Letting children stay overnight at a friend’s home without talking
to the parents.
17. Bringing one partner after another into your life.
18. Never doing anything alone with your children.
19. Working so much that there is no time to spend with children.
20. Promising to do something with your children and then canceling
out because you have lost interest.
21. Treating yourself to new things but expecting children to make do
with what they have.
22. Refusing to allow children to participate in outside activities
because it’s inconvenient.
23. Allowing children to watch adult (sex and violence) movies.
24. Smoking cigarettes.
25. Never taking children’s side against a teacher or always taking
children’s side against a teacher.
26. Never attending parent-teacher conferences or other school
activities.
27. Making children late to school by not getting up in the morning.
28. Having extremely high or low expectations of children.
29. Allowing your children to skip school because you want their
company or because you do not feel like getting them dressed.
Id. The Davenport, Iowa school adapted this survey from the Quad-City Times. Id.; see also
Doris Wild Helmering, Are You a (Passive) Child Abuser?, QUAD-CITY TIMES (Apr. 29, 1991).
139
140 CONG. REC. S.1097-01 (1994). Senator Grassley’s amendment to the PPRA was
adopted by a unanimous vote of 93 yeas. Id. See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1232h (1994).
140
20 U.S.C. § 1232h(a)-(b) (1994). The only modification made from the 1978 Act to the
Goals 2000 Act occurred in subsection (b). Compare 20 U.S.C. § 1232h(b) (1982) with 20
U.S.C. § 1232h(b) (1994). Unlike the original statute, which regulated psychiatric and
psychological examination, testing, or treatment, the 1994 amendment altered the
regulation to limits on “surveys, analysis, or evaluations.” 20 U.S.C. § 1232h(b) (1994).
Subsequently, the 1994 amendment dropped the definitions of psychiatric and
psychological examination, testing, or treatment found in 34 C.F.R. §§ 98.3-98.4. See supra
note 132 (citing the full text of §§ 98.3-98.4).
141
20 U.S.C. § 1232h(c) (1994). Subsection (c), which defines notice, states that
“[e]ducational agencies and institutions shall give parents and students effective notice of
their rights under this section.” Id. Subsection (d), which contains the enforcement
regulation, states the following:
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each new subsection granted specific power to the Secretary of the
Department of Education.142 Consequently, the Secretary was embodied
with new responsibilities of forewarning parents of upcoming surveys,
carrying out certain enforcement obligations, and creating a review
board to investigate possible PPRA violations.143
In 2002, Congress again had the opportunity to review the Hatch
Amendment.144
The occasion transpired because of the debate
concerning the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (“No Child Act”),
which greatly reinforced the Elementary and Secondary Act of 1965.145
Congress enacted the No Child Act in large part “to close the
achievement gap with accountability, flexibility, and choice, so that no
child is left behind.”146 However, only a small portion of the No Child
Act directly affects the PPRA.147

The Secretary shall take such action as the Secretary determines
appropriate to enforce this section, except that action to terminate
assistance provided under an applicable program shall be taken only if
the Secretary determines that (1) there has been a failure to comply with such section; and
(2i) compliance with such section cannot be secured by
voluntary means.
20 U.S.C. § 1232h(d). And, subsection (e), which establishes the office and review board,
states that “[t]he Secretary shall establish or designate an office and review board within
the Department of Education to investigate, process, review, and adjudicate violations of
the rights established under this section.” 20 U.S.C. § 1232h(e).
142
See 20 U.S.C. § 1232(c)-(e).
143
Id.
144
See No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425, 2083-88
(Supp. 2002). Senator Bunning, in support for the Act, stated during the proceedings and
debate that “[e]very child in America deserves a good education, and the President is
exactly right when he says no child should be left behind.” 147 CONG. REC. S13366 (2001).
This Act, he concluded, “is a win-win-win bill for students, parents and schools.” Id.
145
Prior to the No Child Left Behind Act, the Elementary and Secondary Act was the
nation’s “largest and most comprehensive federal education law.” Donald M. Payne,
Reflections on Legislation: Reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act:
Challenges Throughout the Legislative Process, 26 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 315, 316 (2002).
146
No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425, 2083-88.
Congressman Todd Tiahrt introduced the No Child Left Behind amendment to the PPRA.
See
U.S.
Department
of
Education,
FPCO
Hot
Topics,
at
http://www.ed.gov/offices/OII/fpco/hot_topics/ht_04-10-02.html (last modified May 7,
2003) [hereinafter Hot Topics]. In addition to Congressman Tiahrt, Senator Shelby
supported the PPRA’s amendment. 147 CONG. REC. S13373 (2001). In fact, during the
proceedings and debate for the No Child Left Behind Act, Senator Shelby expressed his
views on the importance of the PPRA’s amendment:
The need for this provision stems from the growing practice of a large
number of marketing companies going into classrooms and using class
time to gather personal information about students and their families

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol39/iss1/6

Garrison: "Children Are Not Second Class Citizens": Can Parents Stop Publi

2004]

"Children Are Not Second Class Citizens"

177

The primary purpose of the No Child Act’s amendment to the PPRA
was to restructure the statute’s function back to Senator Hatch’s original
intentions in 1978, giving parents more deference in their children’s
education.148 The No Child Act thus evolved to improve parental rights
in public schools by creating new provisions; the two primary provisions
mandate that all local educational agencies (“LEAs”) develop policies
focusing on parental rights and then notify parents of those established
rights.149 In addition, the law expanded to incorporate all types of social
surveys, including those that are federally funded and those that are
not.150 The No Child Act’s amendment had one goal in mind—to protect
parents and students from invasive surveys.151
The No Child Act remodeled the PPRA in two distinct ways.152 First,
it amended subsection (b) by including an eighth category of regulation,

for purely commercial purposes. In many cases, parents are not even
aware that these companies have entered their children’s school, much
less that they are exploiting them in the one place they should be the
safest, their classroom . . . . The goal of these laws, as is the case with
our provision, is to ensure that the privacy of children is protected and
that their personal information cannot be collected and/or
disseminated without the prior knowledge and, most importantly, the
ability of parents to exclude their children from such activities.
Id.
See No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425, 2083-88.
Id.; see also Hot Topics, supra note 146, at 2.
149
O’Donnell, supra note 115, at 684. Specifically, “the law was greatly expanded to
include passive parental consent for activities involving the collection, disclosure or use of
personal information in connection with marketing; the administration of any nonDepartment of Education funded survey that contains one or more of the eight topics; or
non-emergency invasive physical exams or screenings.” Id. at 685. The word “passive” is
used in the sense of notice and an opportunity to object, versus active, which requires prior
written consent. Id. at 717 n.30. “The term ‘personal information’ means individually
identifiable information including: (i) a student or parent’s first and last name; (ii) a home
or other physical address (including street name and the name of the city or town); (iii) a
telephone number; or (iv) a Social Security identification number.”
20 U.S.C.A.
§ 1232h(c)(6)(E) (West Supp. 2004). The term “survey” includes evaluations. 20 U.S.C.A.
§ 1232h(c)(6)(G).
And finally, invasive physical examination means “any medical
examination that involves the exposure of private body parts, or any act during such
examination that includes incisions, insertion, or injection into the body, but does not
include a hearing, vision, or scoliosis screening.” No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L.
No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425, 2087.
150
O’Donnell, supra note 115, at 684. Unlike subsections (a) and (b) of the law, which
contain the limiting phrase “as part of any applicable program,” subsection (c) of the law
applies to LEAs that receive funds under any applicable program.” See 20 U.S.C.A.
§ 1232h(a)-(c)(West Supp. 2004).
151
See Hot Topics, supra note 146, at 3.
152
20 U.S.C.A. § 1232h (West Supp. 2004).
147
148
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which focuses on students and their religious beliefs and affiliations.153
Second, it added an entirely new provision by reformatting subsection
(c).154 Prior to the No Child Act’s alterations, subsection (c) focused on
the requirement of parental notice.155 However, with the enactment of
the No Child Act, subsection (c) now concentrates on two aspects: the
development of local policies and the enhancement of parental
notification.156 First, the No Child Act requires all schools to develop

153
20 U.S.C.A. § 1232h(b) (West Supp. 2004). Subsection (a) of the original PPRA was not
amended. Compare 20 U.S.C. § 1232h(a) (1982) with 20 U.S.C.A. § 1232h(b) (West Supp.
2004). With the enactment of a new category, subsection (b) now reads:
No student shall be required, as part of any applicable program, to
submit to a survey, analysis, or evaluation that reveals information
concerning:
(1) political affiliations or beliefs of the student or the
student’s parent;
(2) mental or psychological problems of the student or the
student’s family;
(3) sex behavior or attitudes;
(4) illegal, anti-social, self-incriminating, or demeaning
behavior;
(5) critical appraisals of other individuals with whom
respondents have close family relationships;
(6) legally
recognized
privileged
or
analogous
relationships, such as those of lawyers, physicians, and
ministers;
(7) religious practices, affiliations, or beliefs of the student or
student’s parent; or
(8) income (other than that required by law to determine
eligibility for participation in a program or for receiving
financial assistance under such program),
without the prior consent of the student (if the student is an adult or
emancipated minor), or in the case of an unemancipated minor,
without the prior written consent of the parent.
Id. (emphasis added to show the new category).
154
See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1232h(c) (West Supp. 2004).
155
20 U.S.C. § 1232h(c) (1994); see supra note 141 (displaying the Goals 2000 notice
requirement). Now, after the No Child Act’s enactment, the notice requirement has moved
to subsection (d), the enforcement requirement has moved to subsection (e), and the office
and review board requirement has moved to subsection (f). 20 U.S.C.A. § 1232h(d)-(f)
(West Supp. 2004).
156
See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1232h(c) (West Supp. 2004). Subsection (c) now reads, in part:
(c) Development of local policies concerning student privacy,
parental access to information, and administration of certain physical
examinations to minors
(1) Development and adoption of local policies
Except as provided in subsections (a) and (b) of
this section, a local educational agency that
receives funds under any applicable program shall
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develop and adopt policies, in consultation with
parents, regarding the following:
(A)(i) The right of a parent of a student to inspect, upon the
request of the parent, a survey created by a third party
before the survey is administered or distributed by a school
to a student; and
(ii) any applicable procedures for granting a request by a
parent for reasonable access to such survey within a
reasonable period of time after the request is received.
(B) Arrangements to protect student privacy that are
provided by the agency in the event of the administration or
distribution of a survey to a student containing one or more
of the following items (including the right of a parent of a
student to inspect, upon the request of the parent, any
survey containing one or more of such items):
(i) Political affiliations or beliefs of the student or the
student’s parent.
(ii) Mental or psychological problems of the student or the
student’s family.
(iii) Sex behavior or attitudes.
(iv) Illegal, anti-social, self-incriminating, or demeaning
behavior.
(v) Critical appraisals of other individuals with whom
respondents have close family relationships.
(vi) Legally recognized privileged or analogous
relationships, such as those of lawyers, physicians, and
ministers.
(vii) Religious practices, affiliations, or beliefs of the student
or student’s parent.
(viii) Income (other than that required by law to determine
eligibility for participation in a program or for receiving
financial assistance under such program).
....
(2) Parental notification
(A) Notification of policies
The policies developed by a local educational agency under
paragraph (1) shall provide for reasonable notice of the
adoption or continued use of such policies directly to the
parents of students enrolled in schools served by that
agency. At a minimum, the agency shall (i) provide such notice at least annually, at the beginning of
the school year, and within a reasonable period of time after
any substantive change in such policies; and
(ii) offer an opportunity for the parent (and for purposes of
an activity described in subparagraph (C)(i), in the case of a
student of an appropriate age, the student) to opt the student
out of participation in an activity described in subparagraph
(C).
(B) Notification of specific events
The local educational agency shall directly notify the parent
of a student, at least annually at the beginning of the school

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2004

179

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 39, No. 1 [2004], Art. 6

180

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

and adopt policies with parents concerning parents’ rights under the
PPRA.157 Second, the No Child Act provision forces LEAs to provide
annual notice to parents of scheduled surveys, opportunities for parents
to remove their children from certain activities, and specific alternatives
available for children whose parents choose to remove them from such
testing.158 Accordingly, the No Child Act’s modifications altered the face

year, of the specific or approximate dates during the school
year when activities described in subparagraph (C) are
scheduled, or expected to be scheduled.
(C) Activities requiring notification
The following activities require notification under this
paragraph:
(i) Activities involving the collection, disclosure, or use of
personal information collected from students for the purpose
of marketing or for selling that information (or otherwise
providing that information to others for that purpose).
(ii) The administration of any survey containing one or more
items described in clauses (i) through (viii) of paragraph
(1)(B).
(iii) Any nonemergency, invasive physical examination or
screening that is (I) required as a condition of attendance;
(II) administered by the school and scheduled by the school
in advance; and
(III) not necessary to protect the immediate health and safety
of the student, or of other students.
Id. (excluding § 1232h(c)(3)-(5)).
157
See id.
158
Id. The activities that parents may remove their children from include the following:
“the collection, disclosure, or use of personal information collected from students for the
purpose of marketing or for selling that information, or otherwise providing that
information to others for that purpose.” Id. However, the law does not include
information that is collected for the following:
(i) College or other postsecondary education recruitment, or military
recruitment;
(ii) Book clubs, magazines, and programs providing access to low-cost
literacy products;
(iii) Curriculum and instructional materials used by elementary
schools and secondary schools;
(iv) Tests and assessments used by elementary schools and secondary
schools to provide cognitive, evaluative, diagnostic, clinical, aptitude,
or achievement information about students . . . .
(v) The sale by students of products or services to raise funds for
school-related or education-related activities; and
(vi) Student recognition programs.
Id. § 1232h(c)(4)(A).
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of the statute by adding much more specificity in subsection (c)
regarding policy-making and parental notification.159
With each amendment over the past thirty years, Congress has
asserted its desire to help uninformed parents shield their children from
nonacademic probing.160 Ultimately, legislation appears to recognize
that “parents have a right and a responsibility to be involved in their
children’s education.”161 However, despite the legislature’s professed
objective to place parents in a stronger position, the judicial system has
interpreted the PPRA otherwise and ultimately damaged Congress’
purported intention.162
E. The Judicial Interpretation of the PPRA
Since the PPRA’s official enactment in 1978, it has not received much
attention.163
In fact, until recently, the process was so overly
burdensome that many parents stood helpless while researchers invaded
their children’s schools.164 However, since 2001, the judicial system has

See id. § 1232h(c).
See 147 CONG. REC. S13373 (2001). In defending the No Child Act’s amendment,
Senator Shelby very clearly blamed public schools for the increasing problems with noneducational activities through their continued allowance of researchers into their schools.
Id.
161
Id. Senator Shelby stressed the importance of the No Child Act as a provision that
“enhances parental involvement by giving them an opportunity to decide for themselves
who does and does not get access to their children during the school day.” Id.
162
See infra Part II.E.
163
See generally Namazi v. Univ. of Cincinnati Coll. of Med., 3 Fed. App. 482 (6th Cir.
2001) (finding no meritorious basis to file a PPRA claim); Altman v. Bedford Cent. Sch.
Dist., 45 F. Supp. 2d 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that neither the plain meaning of the
PPRA nor the Congressional intent behind the PPRA provides an implied private right of
action); Herbert v. Reinstein, 976 F. Supp. 331 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (holding that because plaintiff
was not required by Temple to submit to any psychological examination as part of any
applicable program, he cannot claim an enforceable right under the PPRA and he cannot
establish a § 1983 claim based on a violation of § 1232h); Newkirk v. E. Lansing Pub. Sch.,
1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13194 (W.D. Mich. 1993) (holding that the teachers’ and counselor’s
use of psychotherapeutic materials and activities with the student without the parents’
informed consent did not violate the PPRA because the plaintiffs were not within the class
of intended beneficiaries of the PPRA and could not use § 1983 as a vehicle to enforce their
claim against defendants); Triplett v. Livingston County Bd. of Educ., 967 S.W.2d 25 (Ky.
App. 1997) (holding that the Kentucky Instructional Results Information System
assessment exam, which assessed student skills in reading, mathematics, writing, science,
and social studies, did not violate the PPRA).
164
140 CONG. REC. 1097-01 (1994); see supra note 137 (describing the PPRA’s procedures
on filing a complaint).
159
160
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decided a few very important cases regarding the PPRA and FERPA.165
Both statutes are theoretically beneficial, providing parents and students
with a safety net to avoid intrusive surveys and questionnaires, while
creating a system of checks-and-balances for school districts to regulate
nonacademic material.166 Nevertheless, the courts have not acted
favorably toward either statute.167 Specifically, the New Jersey district
court opinion in C.N. v. Ridgewood Board of Education and the Supreme
Court’s opinions in Oswasso Independent School District v. Falvo and
Gonzaga University v. Doe leave both FERPA and the PPRA ineffective in
protecting parents and their children.168
In 2001, the PPRA faced one of its strongest judicial setbacks in C.N.
v. Ridgewood Board of Education.169 In C.N., an organization called the
Human Resources Coordinating Council contacted a local middle and
high school, wanting to research various students in its community.170
The group convinced the school board that it was in Ridgewood’s best
interest to survey the student population to gain insight into the
community’s youth.171 After Ridgewood conceded to the survey’s
distribution, the district’s superintendent notified all parents of the
upcoming event, asserting that the survey was voluntary and

165
Oswasso Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Falvo, 534 U.S. 426 (2002); Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S.
273 (2002); C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 146 F. Supp. 2d 528 (D.N.J. 2001).
166
Hot Topics, supra note 146, at 1-5.
167
See infra notes 169-230 and accompanying text.
168
Hot Topics, supra note 146, at 1-5.
169
146 F. Supp. 2d 528. The version of the PPRA analyzed in C.N. is the 1994 provision
under the Goals 2000 Act. See supra notes 133-43 and accompanying text (discussing the
1994 provision which established three new subsections: regulating notice, enforcement,
and the requirements of an office and review board). The plaintiffs in the action are all
residents of Ridgewood and are the parents of three minor girls, two of whom attended
Ridgewood High School and the other at Benjamin Franklin Middle School. Id. at 530. The
defendants included the Ridgewood Board of Education and several school administrators,
including Frederick J. Stokley, Superintendent of Schools; Joyce Snider, Assistant
Superintendent; Ronald Verdicchio, member of the central administration; Robert Weakley,
Director of Human Resources; John Mucciolo, Ridgewood High School Principal; Anthony
Bencivenga, Benjamin Franklin Middle School Principal; and Sheila Brogan, President of
the Board of Education. Id.
170
Id. at 530. The organization was comprised of public and private social service
agencies. Id. “The HRCC created a ‘Vision Team’ to supervise the project, which included
thirty persons from every sector of the community, including school officials and one
student.” Id.
171
Id. Defendants claimed that the survey’s purpose was to both “strengthen the
community’s resolve” in hopes of better understanding their youth as well as to prevent an
incident like the infamous Columbine High School shootings. Id. at 531 n.2.
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anonymous.172 On the day of administration, students were required to
answer either, “Never,” “Once,” “Twice,” “3-4 Times,” or “5 or More
Times,” to whether they had:
(56) Stolen something from a store.
(57) Gotten in trouble with the police.
(58) Hit or beat up someone.
(59) Damaged property just for fun (such as breaking
windows, scratching a car, putting paint on walls,
etc.).173
After the survey’s distribution, a few parents filed suit pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a deprivation of their rights secured by the
Constitution, FERPA, and the PPRA.174 Specifically, the parents argued
that they had a right to know the survey’s true content before it was
administered to their children.175 The district court disagreed.176 In fact,
172
Id. at 530-31. The survey was called, “Profiles of Student Life,” and was administered
to two thousand junior and senior high school students. The O’Reilly Factor, Back of the
Book: Interview with Steve Aden (Fox News television broadcast, Jan. 17, 2002), available at
2002 WL 5594638. The survey did not provide a space for students to place their names.
C.N., 146 F. Supp. 2d at 531. It was produced by the Search Institute of Minneapolis,
Minnesota, consisted of 156 questions, and cost $4,800 to be conducted. Id.; see also The
O’Reilly Factor, supra.
173
C.N., 146 F. Supp. 2d at 530-31. Students were given three types of questions to fill
out. Id. at 531-32. First, students were asked to answer each question with “Strongly
Agree,” “Agree,” “Not Sure,” “Disagree,” or “Strongly Disagree.” Id. Some of the
questions included the following:
(40) I get along well with my parents.
(43) If I break one of my parent’s rules, I usually get punished.
(45) It is against my values to have sex while I am a teenager.
Id. at 531. Additionally, students were asked “how many times over the last two weeks
they had imbibed alcohol, specific types of drugs, or had driven a vehicle after drinking
alcohol.” Id. Finally, “[f]urther areas covered by the survey included violent and criminal
behavior and sexual activity and proclivities.” Id.
174
Id. at 531. Specifically, the plaintiffs believed that their First, Fourth, Fifth, and
Fourteenth Amendment rights had been violated in addition to the FERPA and PPRA. Id.
at 530.
175
Id. The parents argued that the survey’s inappropriate content invaded their
children’s right to privacy. Id. In addition, the parents alleged the following:
[P]rior to the administration of the survey the defendants failed to
notify parents as to how and when the survey would be administered,
how students could elect not to participate, how nonparticipating
students would be accommodated, whether parental consent would be
required before their child could take the survey, whether parents had
a right to object to their child taking the survey, how parents could
object to their child taking the survey, and whether certain questions
would be subject to a Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination.
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it held that neither the PPRA, nor FERPA, creates a private right to relief,
thereby restricting the parents access to the judicial system.177
Before the court dismissed the parents’ complaint, it first reviewed
the PPRA’s express language, concluding that Ridgewood did not
violate any part of the statute’s provisions.178 First, and foremost, Judge
Politan reviewed subsection (b) of the PPRA, which mandates that
schools obtain parental consent when they require students to participate
in a social survey.179 He determined that because the PPRA only
compels written parental consent when the survey “requires” a pupil to
participate, the Ridgewood survey did not violate the statute because it
was given on a voluntary basis.180 Thus, the court rejected the parents’
PPRA assertion, declaring that the statute’s express language only
directs that those surveys requiring student participation also require
parental consent.181
Id. at 531-32.
176
Id. at 533-40. One reason the court gave for the dismissal of the parents’ complaint
was because Ridgewood’s survey did not qualify under the PPRA because it lacked federal
funds. Id. This argument, however, would now fail because the No Child’s amendment to
the PPRA closed this loophole regarding federally funded surveys. See supra notes 144-59
and accompanying text (discussing how the No Child Left Behind amendment to the PPRA
expanded to give parents protection against federally and non-federally funded surveys).
177
Id. at 535. On appeal, the Third Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals reversed the district’s
court ruling regarding the parents’ constitutional claims, stating the following:
The Circuit Court agreed with the parents that the school’s
administration of the questionnaire may have violated the First
Amendment’s prohibition against compelled speech and the Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable intrusion into the
household. The Court also agreed with the parents that the Board may
have violated ‘the substantive due process rights for the adults to raise
their children.’ The court remanded the case to the lower court.
See Schlafly, Changed!, supra note 119.
178
C.N., 146 F. Supp. 2d at 535. One counter-argument the defendants asserted was that
the law governing student surveys was unclear at the time the Ridgewood surveys were
administered and thus did not provide enough specificity for the district to follow. Id. The
defendants asserted this argument under the genre of “qualified immunity.” Id. at 533-34.
Essentially, “municipal officers enjoy qualified immunity if ‘their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.’” Id. at 534 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Thus, the
court explained that a right is apparent when the “contours of the right [are] sufficiently
clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.”
Id. (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) (alteration in original)).
179
See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1232h(b) (West Supp. 2004).
180
C.N., 146 F. Supp. 2d at 534. The court also made notice that the statute is silent on the
fact that if a student is “required” to take a survey, if he or she is also “required” to answer
the survey, or if he may decline. Id. at 537.
181
Id.
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Next, the C.N. court analyzed the § 1983 claim.182 The court
concluded that neither the PPRA nor FERPA provides a private right of
action.183 First, the court discussed the basic premise of a §1983 claim,
which must demonstrate a violation of a constitutional or statutory right,
as well as a deprivation under the color of state law.184 Thus, because the
PPRA does not expressly create enforceable rights for private persons,
Id. A § 1983 claim is filed when an individual believes that he has a “civil action for a
deprivation of [his] rights.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2002). That statute states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought
against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s
judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.
For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable
exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a
statute of the District of Columbia.
Id. (emphasis added). Accordingly, it is for the courts to decide first whether the injured
individual has a right either under the Constitution or one created through a statute to
obtain relief and second whether or not the claim is viable. See Sheldon Nahmod,
Symposium on Section 1983: The Restructuring of Narrative and Empathy in Section 1983 Cases,
72 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 819 (1997).
183
C.N., 146 F. Supp. 2d at 535 (citing Tarka v. Franklin, 891 F.2d 102, 104 (5th Cir. 1989)
(implying no private right of action under FERPA); Fay v. S. Colonie Cent. Sch. Dist., 802
F.2d 21, 33 (2d Cir. 1986) (finding that FERPA does not provide for a private right of
action); Girardier v. Webster Coll., 563 F.2d 1267, 1276-77 (8th Cir. 1977) (finding that
FERPA does not provide a private remedy); Altman v. Bedford Cent. Sch. Dist., 45 F. Supp.
2d 368, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that the PPRA provides no implied private right of
action); Herbert v. Reinstein, 976 F. Supp. 331, 339 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (holding that the PPRA
does not provide for a § 1983 claim); Hartfield v. E. Grand Rapids Pub. Sch., 960 F. Supp.
1259, 1264 (W.D. Mich. 1997) (finding that FERPA does not create a private right of action);
Doe v. Knox County Bd. of Educ., 918 F. Supp. 181, 184 (E.D. Ky. 1996) (finding that FERPA
does not give rise to a private cause of action but does create an interest that may be
vindicated in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action); Odom v. Columbia Univ., 906 F. Supp. 188, 195
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding that FERPA does not provide for a private right of action);
Belanger v. Nashua, N.H. Sch. Dist., 856 F. Supp. 40, 43 n.4 (D.N.H. 1994) (noting that
courts consistently hold that no private right of action exists under FERPA); Rothman v.
Emory Univ., 828 F. Supp. 537, 542 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (finding that in enacting FERPA,
Congress did not create a private cause of action); Norris v. Bd. of Educ. of Greenwood
Cmty. Sch. Corp., 797 F. Supp. 1452, 1462 (S.D. Ind. 1992) (finding that FERPA does not
provide for a private right of action); Norwood v. Slammons, 788 F. Supp. 1020, 1026 (W.D.
Ark. 1991) (finding that although FERPA creates no private cause of action, a plaintiff may
assert a FERPA violation as the basis for a claim under § 1983); Smith v. Duquesne Univ.,
612 F. Supp. 72, 80 (W.D. Pa. 1985) (finding that the dispositive language in FERPA
disfavors the implication of a private remedy).
184
C.N., 146 F. Supp. 2d at 536.
182
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but instead grants rights through an “applicable program,” the technical
meaning of the statute only allows possible claims to be filed by the
Secretary of the Department of Education.185 The district court therefore
concluded that the PPRA, as written, provides no judicial relief for
parents.186
The C.N. analysis clearly weakened the PPRA.187 Yet, because the
statute lacked scrutiny from the highest court, the PPRA still had
potential viability. One year later the Supreme Court took the
opportunity to analyze parental rights in two cases: Oswasso Independent
School District v. Falvo188 and Gonzaga University v. Doe.189 Both cases,
Id. at 537. An “applicable program” is the following:
[A]ny program for which the Secretary or the Department has
administrative responsibility as provided by law or by delegation of
authority pursuant to law. The term includes each program for which
the Secretary or the Department has administrative responsibility
under the Department of Education Organization Act or under Federal
law effective after the effective date of the Act[,] [May 4, 1980].
20 U.S.C. § 1221(c)(1) (1994) (citations omitted).
186
C.N., 146 F. Supp. 2d at 537. Following C.N., the state of New Jersey implemented a
new law analogous to the federal version of the PPRA. Eagle Forum, Ridgewood Parents
Wonder if New Law Will Stop Nosy Questionnaires, available at http://www.eagleforum.org/
educate/2002/feb02/nosy-questions.shtml (last visited Sept. 9, 2004) [hereinafter Nosy
Questionnaires]; see also Evonne Courtros, Parental Ok for Pupil Surveys Clears Hurdle Senate
Passes Bill on 28-5 Vote, THE RECORD, Dec. 5, 2000, at A03, available at 2000 WL 15844283.
Ms. Courtros’ article discusses the various reactions to the state’s enactment of a law
synonymous to the PPRA. Id. at 2. For example, the former president of the New Jersey
School Boards Association, who was also a member of the Ridgewood school board,
criticized the new law stating that “[i]t’s going to make it much more difficult for school
boards and communities to deal with the kinds of situations that give rise to a Columbine.”
Id.
187
While the trial took place, a group created by the Department of Education, the
Family Policy Compliance Office, independently investigated the Ridgewood School
District. Schlafly, Changed!, supra note 119, at 2. On December 18, 2001, after two years of
investigation, the department issued a fifteen page letter to the school district stating that
Ridgewood had, in fact, violated all four requirements of the PPRA:
(1) the survey was funded with federal education (Goals 2000) funds;
(2) the students were “required” to participate in the survey; (3) the
survey asked questions that would reveal information in three of the
prohibited information categories; and (4) the school district did not
obtain prior written parental consent from the parents.
Id.
188
534 U.S. 426 (2002). The issue presented in Falvo addressed “whether peer-graded
classroom work and assignments are education records.” Id. at 429. Respondents filed a
§ 1983 action against the school district and school officials, claiming that “peer grading”
violated FERPA. Id. The District Court granted the petitioners summary judgment motion
and held that student-graded papers are not within the FERPA definition of “education
records.” Id. The Tenth Circuit, on the other hand, reversed, holding that FERPA provided
respondent with a cause of action enforceable under § 1983, that student-graded papers do
185
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unlike C.N., focus only on the PPRA’s sister statute, FERPA.190 However,
the holdings in both Falvo and Gonzaga are relevant for the PPRA, and
have influence on the statute’s future effectiveness.
In Falvo, a teacher’s method of allowing peer grading was challenged
as violating FERPA.191 The Court concluded that a student’s individual
class work did not qualify as education records because education
records typically only include “institutional records.”192 Thus, it held
that peer grading does not violate FERPA.193 Nevertheless, the key
element of Falvo is that the Supreme Court did not entertain the question
of whether FERPA provides private parties a right of action under
§ 1983, the ultimate finding in C.N.194 The Supreme Court’s avoidance
was simple—the question was to be answered four months later in
Gonzaga.195
Gonzaga, like Falvo, focused on the scope of FERPA.196 In Gonzaga,
the respondent student attended Gonzaga University pursuing a degree
fit within the parameters of FERPA, and that the very act of grading is an impermissible
release of information to the student grader. Id.
189
536 U.S. 273 (2002). The issue presented in Gonzaga asked “whether a student may sue
a private university for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enforce provisions of the Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, which prohibit the federal funding of
educational institutions that have a policy or practice of releasing education records to
unauthorized persons.” Id. at 276 (citations omitted).
190
See Hot Topics, supra note 146.
191
Falvo, 534 U.S. at 430.
192
Id. at 426. The Court concluded that “institutional records” include student grade
point averages, standardized test scores, and records of disciplinary actions. Id.; see also
Quinlan Publishing Group, Highest Court Finds Peer Grading Does Not Violate FERPA, at
http://www.quinlan.com/spotlights/ss020729.shtml (last visited Sept. 9, 2004).
193
Falvo, 534 U.S. at 427.
194
Id. at 430. Before the Court began its analysis in Falvo, it asserted the following
disclaimer: “At the outset, we note it is an open question whether FERPA provides private
parties, like respondent, with a cause of action enforceable under § 1983. We have granted
certiorari on this issue in another case.” Id. The Court reasoned that because neither party
in Falvo had challenged the § 1983 issue before the Court of Appeals, it was not going to
address it. Id. at 430-31.
195
For more information regarding the Court’s analysis in Falvo, see Kelly A. Nash, Note,
Peer Grading Outlawed: How the Tenth Circuit Misinterpreted the Family Educational Rights and
Privacy Act in Falvo v. Owasso Independent School District, 25 HAMLINE L. REV. 479 (2002);
and Randi M. Rothberg, Comment, Not as Simple as Learning the ABC’s: A Comment on
Owasso Independent School District No. I-011 v. Falvo and the State of the Family Educational
Rights and Privacy Act, 9 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 27 (2002).
196
536 U.S. at 277; see also 20 U.S.C. 1232g (2000) (setting out FERPA in its entirety).
FERPA mandates that any school that releases its students’ educational records to an
unauthorized person without that student’s consent will be denied its federal funds. See
Cheryl A. Priest, Comment, Civil Procedure: The Right to Sue Under Section 1983, 55 FLA. L.
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in education.197 However, after a university employee overheard a
conversation between two students, focusing on alleged sexual
misconduct by the respondent, the employee called the agency
responsible for granting the state’s teaching certificates.198 During the
conversation with the agency, the employee identified the student and
discussed the allegations she had overheard.199 As a result, the student
was denied an affidavit of good moral character, which was required of
all new teachers in the state.200 Furthermore, the respondent was told he
would not receive his teaching certificate.201 The respondent sued both
the employee and the university asserting a FERPA violation under
§ 1983.202 He argued that the university violated FERPA by sharing
confidential information from his education records without obtaining
his consent; such a violation, he stressed, permits a claim of relief under
§ 1983.203
REV. 753, 753 (2003). See generally Cara Runsick Mitchell, Defanging the Paper Tiger: Why
Gonzaga Did Not Adequately Address Judicial Construction of FERPA, 37 GA. L. REV. 755
(2003) (arguing that Gonzaga merely clarified the lower courts ambiguity regarding § 1983
claims under FERPA).
197
536 U.S. at 279. Gonzaga University is a private institution in Spokane, Washington.
Id. at 277. Respondent’s intention was to teach at a public elementary school in the State of
Washington. Id. at 273.
198
Id. at 277. Respondent did not learn of the investigation, or that information about
him had been disclosed, until March 1994—six months after the university employee called
the agency. Id.
199
Id.
200
Id.
201
Id. At one time, the State of Washington mandated that all new teachers wanting to
work in Washington secure an affidavit of good moral character from their graduating
college or university. Id. Without the affidavit, a newly graduated teacher could not teach
in that state. Id.
202
Id. In addition to the § 1983 claim, respondent filed claims alleging violations of
Washington tort and contract law. Id. The lower court agreed with respondent’s FERPA
claim and entered judgment for $1,155,000, including $300,000 in punitive damages. Id.
After the judgment was rendered, the university appealed. Id. The Washington Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that FERPA does not provide an individual a private right to
sue under § 1983. Id. at 278. Thereafter, the Washington Supreme Court reversed. Id.
“The State Supreme Court reasoned that while FERPA does not explicitly grant a private
right of action, its nondisclosure provision creates a federal right enforceable under section
1983.” Priest, supra note 196, at 753. The United States Supreme Court then granted
certiorari because it realized how split the lower courts were on whether FERPA was
enforceable under § 1983. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 278 n.2 (citing Falvo v. Owasso Indep. Sch.
Dist., 233 F.3d 1203, 1210 (10th Cir. 2000)); Brown v. Oneonta, 106 F.3d 1125, 1131-32 (2d
Cir. 1997); Gundlach v. Reinstein, 924 F. Supp. 684, 692 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Meury v. EagleUnion Cmty. Sch. Corp., 714 N.E.2d 233, 239 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)). Thus, the Supreme
Court wanted the opportunity to clarify the ambiguity regarding FERPA. Id. at 278.
203
Id. at 273. In 1980, the Supreme Court held for the first time that § 1983 claims can be
based on the Constitution and also on violations of federal statutory law. Id. at 279; see also

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol39/iss1/6

Garrison: "Children Are Not Second Class Citizens": Can Parents Stop Publi

2004]

"Children Are Not Second Class Citizens"

189

The Supreme Court, however, rejected the respondent’s claim and
held that private citizens do not have enforceable rights under FERPA.204
Specifically, the Court concluded that because FERPA’s language only
confers an express right on the Secretary of the Department of Education,
the statute is unenforceable by private persons.205 In the analysis, Chief
Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980). Since Thiboutot, the Court has identified “two
independent ways for a private individual to enforce a federal statute that [does] not
explicitly confer a private remedy: (1) through an action under § 1983 or (2) through a
court-implied private cause of action arising directly under the statute itself.” Cases: III.
Federal Statutes and Regulations, D. Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 372, 372 (2002) [hereinafter Cases: III]. However, despite the Court’s establishment of
the two factors, lower courts have inconsistently evaluated § 1983 claims. Id.; see also
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981). In Pennhurst, the Supreme
Court held that there was virtually no indication from the plain language of the
Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act that Congress created rights
and obligations pursuant to its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. Pennhurst,
451 U.S. at 4. To the contrary, the Act’s language and structure demonstrated that it was a
mere federal-state funding statute. Id. at 1. Moreover, the Act sought to improve care to
individuals by encouraging better state planning, coordination, and demonstration
projects, not requiring the states to fund newly declared individual rights. Id. at 3. But see
Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498 (1990). The Wilder Court held that § 1983 did create
enforceable rights because the Medicaid Act was intended to benefit the hospital
management. Id. It found that the state was obliged to adopt reasonable and adequate
rates and that this obligation was enforceable. Id.; see also Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S.
329 (1997). The Blessing Court found that the Social Security Act Title IV-D could not be
analyzed generally, and held that the Act did not give individuals a federal right to force a
state agency to substantially comply with the law. Id.
204
Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 273. Justices Breyer and Souter concurred in the judgment. Id. at
291 (Breyer J., and Souter J., concurring). Both rejected the majority’s declaration that an
individual’s private right to action under § 1983 must at all times be unambiguously
accorded by the plain language of the statute, arguing that “the statute books are too many,
the laws too diverse, and their purposes too complex, for any single legal formula to offer
more than general guidance.” Id. Nevertheless, Justice Breyer was persuaded by the
majority’s overall holding, finding that Congress precluded the use of FERPA for private
enforcement. Id. at 291-92. Justice Stevens, on the other hand, strongly dissented from the
opinion. Id. at 293 (Stevens, J., and Ginsberg, J., dissenting). He agreed with respondent’s
claim that FERPA “creates a right of nondisclosure of personal information from a
student’s record without consent.” Id.; see infra notes 204-25 and accompanying text
(highlighting Justice Stevens’ opinion).
205
Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 273-74. In the Court’s analysis, it provided examples of statutes,
which it has concluded create enforceable rights under § 1983 claims. Id. Specifically, the
Court recognized that “Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972 create individual rights because those statutes are phrased ‘with an
unmistakable focus on the benefited class.’” Id. at 284 (emphasis in original) (citation
omitted). For example, “Title VI provides: No person in the United States shall . . . be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance’ on the basis of race, color, or national origin.” Id. at 284 n.3 (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000(d) (1994) (emphasis in original) (omission in original). Also, “Title IX provides: No
person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, . . . be subjected to discrimination
under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.’” Id.
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Justice Rehnquist first discussed the requirements for granting relief
under § 1983 and then continued by demonstrating why FERPA does not
qualify under § 1983’s scope.206
First, because FERPA was enacted through Congress’ spending
power, the Supreme Court reviewed and finalized the dispute over how
a person can obtain relief through this type of statute under § 1983.207 It
explained that to seek redress under § 1983, a violation must occur in one
of two ways: either from a violation of rights secured by the United
States Constitution, or from a violation of explicit rights conferred by
Congress.208 Although the Court recognized it had in the past granted
relief under § 1983 by implying a private right of action from various
spending statutes, it stressed that “[w]e now reject the notion that our
cases permit anything short of an unambiguously conferred right to
support a cause of action brought under § 1983.”209 Therefore, this
decision eliminated the ambiguity of past cases by confirming that the
Supreme Court will only grant relief if the alleged spending violation is
expressly found in the statute’s plain language or in the Constitution.210
The Gonzaga Court recognized that although its two approaches for
interpreting federal funding statutes, one where it implies an enforceable
right and the other where it expressly finds an enforceable right, appeared

(quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000)) (emphasis in original). Thus, because both Title VI and
Title IX contain express language creating enforceable rights, both are actionable under
§1983. Id.
206
Id. at 279-91.
207
Id. at 278-86; see also Charles Davant IV, Sorcerer or Sorcerer’s Apprentice?: Federal
Agencies and the Creation of Individual Rights, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 613 (“[T]he Supreme Court
has not squarely addressed whether federal agencies can create individual rights, [they]
behave in a manner that suggests they are creating rights enforceable by private
lawsuits.”).
208
Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 279. In 1980, the Court determined for the first time that private
persons could bring a § 1983 claim as a result of a violation under statutory law. Id. (citing
Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 4). See generally Mitchell, supra note 196.
209
Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283. The Court expressly declared that “unless Congress ‘speaks
with a clear voice,’ and manifests an ‘unambiguous’ intent to confer individual rights,
federal funding provisions provide no basis for private enforcement by § 1983.” Id. at 280
(quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981)); see also Quinlan
Publishing Group, FERPA Suits Not Allowed Under Section 1983 of the U.S. Code, at
http://www.quinlan.com/spotlights/ss020729d.shtml (last visited Sept. 16, 2003)
(outlining the Supreme Court’s decisions in Falvo and Gonzaga).
210
Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283. See generally Cases: III, supra note 203, at 372 (discussing how
the Gonzaga holding should provide more stability in the future for the judicial system to
analyze § 1983 claims).
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different, both actually arise from a single manner of reasoning.211 The
Court emphasized that instead of analyzing the approaches differently,
“our implied right of action cases should guide the determination of
whether a statute confers rights enforceable under § 1983.”212 In fact, the
Court stated that the two approaches overlap—both requiring the Court
to ascertain Congress’ intent in creating the statute.213 If Congress does
not intend to benefit an identifiable group of persons through the
statute’s express language, the Court will not step-in and imply that
Congress intended to do so.214 Therefore, the Supreme Court confirmed
that its two approaches require the same reasoning, as well as require a
plaintiff seeking relief under § 1983 to demonstrate that pursuant to
Congress’ intention, Congress created enforceable rights under the
statute in question.215
Next, the Court depicted the reasons why FERPA does not accord
enforceable rights.216 Chief Justice Rehnquist announced that the statute
Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283. The Court declared that “[w]e have recognized that whether
a statutory violation may be enforced through § 1983 ‘is a different inquiry from that
involved in determining whether a private right of action can be implied from a particular
statute.’” Id. (quoting Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 n.9 (1990)).
212
Id. at 283.
213
Id. In 1997, the Supreme Court established a precise method for determining whether
a particular federal statute creates an enforceable right under § 1983. Blessing v. Freestone,
520 U.S. 329, 340-41 (1997). Blessing stated that first, the court must determine that
Congress intended the provision in question to benefit the plaintiff. Id. at 340. Second, the
court needs to identify whether “the right assertedly protected by the statute is not so
‘vague and amorphous’ that its enforcement would strain judicial competence.” Id. at 34041. Finally, Blessing determined that “the statute must unambiguously impose a binding
obligation on the States.” Id. at 341. Overall, Blessing found that “the provision giving rise
to the asserted right must be couched in mandatory rather than precatory terms.” Id.
214
Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283-84. One year after the Supreme Court decided in Thiboutot
that private citizens can sue under § 1983, the Court established that unless Congress
expressly provides for relief in the statute, that “legislation enacted pursuant to the
spending power, the typical remedy for state noncompliance with federally imposed
conditions is not a private cause of action for noncompliance but rather action by the
Federal Government to terminate funds to the State.” Pennhurst State Sch. And Hsp. v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 4. Since the Court’s decision in Pennhurst, it has only found two
federal funding statutes that create a private right of action. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 280-82; see
Wilder, 496 U.S. at 522-23 (allowing a § 1983 suit under the Medicaid Act); Wright v.
Roanoke Redevelopment and Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 430 (1987) (allowing a § 1983 suit
under the Public Housing Act). But see Blessing, 520 U.S. at 343 (rejecting a § 1983 suit
under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act); Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 359-60 (1992)
(rejecting a § 1983 suit under the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act).
215
Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 284 n.3. The Court added that “[w]here a statute does not include
this sort of explicit ‘right- or duty-creating language’ we rarely impute to Congress an
intent to create a private right of action.” Id.
216
Id. at 287.
211
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“lack[s] the sort of ‘rights-creating’ language critical to showing the
requisite congressional intent to create new rights.”217 He emphasized
that the rights granted under FERPA do not belong to private persons
but to the Secretary of Education.218 Thus, because of the statute’s
language and its administrative obligations on the Secretary, it does not
expressly confer “individual entitlement” to the judicial system.219 As a
result, the Court will not interpret FERPA as having individual rights.220
In his dissent, Justice Stevens’ expressed his disagreement with the
majority’s result.221 He, unlike the majority, believed the statute did
create federal rights for private persons and accused the majority of
crafting “a new category of second-class statutory rights” through their
implied-rights analysis.222 Justice Stevens stressed that when FERPA is
217
Id. (citing Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 288-89 (2001); Cannon v. Univ. of Chi.,
441 U.S. 677, 690 n.13 (1979)).
218
Id. The statute directs “that ‘[n]o funds shall be made available’ to ‘any educational
agency or institution’ which has a prohibited ‘policy or practice.’” Id. (citing 20 U.S.C.
§ 1232g(b)(1) (2000) (alteration in original)).
219
Id. (citing Blessing, 520 U.S. at 343). The Court emphasized its point by quoting its
own language in Cannon, stating:
There would be far less reason to infer a private remedy in favor of
individual persons if Congress, instead of drafting Title IX with an
unmistakable focus on the benefited class, had written it simply as a
ban on discriminatory conduct by recipients of federal funds or as a
prohibition against the disbursement of public funds to educational
institutions engaged in discriminatory practices.
Id. (quoting Cannon, 441 U.S. at 690-93).
220
Id. Rehnquist also focused on FERPA’s nondisclosure provisions, declaring that
because they only refer to “institutional policy and practice” and not an individual’s ability
to act, Congress expressly did not create a right for private citizens. Id. at 288. Finally, the
Court said that because FERPA expressly authorizes various administrative duties upon
the Secretary, including to “deal with violations,” the statute is unusable by individual
persons in the courts. Id. at 289-90.
221
Id. at 293 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
222
Id. (emphasis added). Justice Stevens pressed that the Court’s holding was
unprecedented, exclaiming:
[T]he Court seems to place the unwarranted “burden of showing an
intent to create a private remedy,” on § 1983 plaintiffs. Moreover, by
circularly defining a right actionable under § 1983 as, in essence, “a
right which Congress intended to make enforceable,” the Court has
eroded-if not eviscerated-the long-established principle of
presumptive enforceability of rights under § 1983. Under this reading
of the Court’s opinion, a right under Blessing is second class compared
to a right whose enforcement Congress has clearly intended. Creating
such a hierarchy of rights is not only novel, but it blurs the longrecognized distinction between rights and remedies. And it does
nothing to clarify our § 1983 jurisprudence.
Id. at 302-03 ( citation omitted).
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analyzed as a whole, including the statute’s title, it does provide a
private right of action.223 Additionally, Justice Stevens emphasized that
although the majority focuses on Congress’ lack of explicit rightscreating language, “none of [the Court’s] four most recent cases
involving whether a Spending Clause statute created rights enforceable
under § 1983 . . . involved the sort of ‘no person shall’ rights-creating
language envisioned by the Court.”224 Thus, in accordance with
FERPA’s entire statutory design and the Court’s recent interpretations of
spending legislation, Stevens asserts that the statute does create a private
right of action.225
Gonzaga’s holding firmly established that FERPA only confers a right
on the Secretary of Education to file claims, leaving parents without any
judicial relief.226 The Court’s analysis of FERPA, in both Falvo and
Gonzaga, are valuable because they provide mandatory authority for
future decisions about the validity of FERPA under a § 1983 claim.227
However, these decisions are also valuable because of their foreseeable
effect on the PPRA.228 Specifically, because the statutes are so similar in
text, the Supreme Court’s treatment of FERPA likely predicts the Court’s
Id. at 293-94. Specifically, Stevens argued that “FERPA in its entirety, includes 10
subsections, which create rights for both students and their parents, and describe the
procedures for enforcing and protecting those rights.” Id. at 293. For example, “subsection
(a)(1)(A) accords parents ‘the right to inspect and review the education records of their
children,’” and “[s]ubsection (a)(1)(D) provides that a ‘student or a person applying for
admission’ may waive ‘his right of access’ to certain confidential statements.” Id. at 293-94.
Furthermore, Stevens argued that subsection (a)(2), which refers to “the privacy rights of
students,” and subsection (c), which protects “the rights of privacy of students and their
families,” both create explicit action for students and their parents. Id. at 294; see also 20
U.S.C. § 1232 (2000).
224
Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 297; see also Blessing, 520 U.S. 329; Suter v. Artist M, 503 U.S. 347
(1992); Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n., 496 U.S. 498 (1990); Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment
and Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418 (1987). Mr. Warf wrote in his article that “Stevens considers
the language in FERPA more indicative of congressional intent to create a right than any of the
other statutes the Court previously held to create rights.” Warf, supra note 116, at 214 (emphasis
added).
225
See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 293-303.
226
Id. at 289. “Prior to Gonzaga, the Court had established a clear line of cases
interpreting the language ‘and laws’ within section 1983 to offer protection for ‘rights’ that
were created by Congressional law.” See Warf, supra note 116, at 206; see also Middlesex
County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n., 453 U.S. 1 (1981); Pennhurst State
Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980). Now,
when a plaintiff seeks relief under a Spending Clause statute through § 1983, he “must
assert the violation of a federal right, not merely a violation of federal law.” Gonzaga, 536
U.S. at 282 (quoting Blessing, 520 U.S. 340).
227
See generally Priest, supra note 196 (analyzing how the Supreme Court has interpreted
§ 1983 over the past twenty years).
228
See infra Part III.A (comparing FERPA and the PPRA).
223
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treatment of the PPRA.229 Thus, because Gonzaga “clos[ed] the door on
any section 1983 claim arising from a violation of FERPA,” parents and
students with viable PPRA complaints will likely only be able to look to
the Department of Education for relief.230
III. EXAMINING THE PPRA’S LOOP HOLES
Dear Senator Grassley: I’m pleased to hear of your concern
for our children . . . . It seems that the schools through
curricula have appointed themselves as surrogate parents . . . .
Teachers are to be academic educators. Not parents. Not
psychological conditioners. Not values evaluators. Not
emotion guides. Please help protect our children from the
New World Order.231
For almost eighty years, the courts have recognized that parents
have a fundamental right to direct the upbringing of their children.232
Since that affirmation in Meyer and Pierce, the parent-child relationship
has gained additional recognition through the freedom of intimate
association.233 However, for the past half-century, those rights have
eroded in the public schools.234 In fact, although Congress enacted the
PPRA in an attempt to regulate invasive surveys in elementary and
secondary public schools, the 1978 statute, as well as its two major
amendments, have afforded little, if any, relief for parents and their
children.235

See infra Part III.A; see also infra notes 247-67 and accompanying text.
Warf, supra note 116, at 216.
231
140 CONG. REC. S846-01, S866-67 (1994) (written statement by Steven L. Bailey,
concerned parent, to Senator Grassley). Mr. Bailey attached a survey that his sixth grade
daughter had received that was titled, This Is Me. Id. The questions included the following:
(1) I am happiest when?; (2) I get angry when?; (3) I am frightened by?; (4) I feel love
when?; and (5) I feel sad about? Id.
232
See supra Part II.A; see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 399 (1923); Pierce v. Soc’y of
the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
233
See supra Part II.C. The freedom of intimate association only includes those
relationships surrounding a marriage or family. See supra note 85.
234
See supra Part II.B.
235
See supra Part II.D; see also supra note 119 (providing a part of Senator Hatch’s speech
which addressed his intentions behind the PPRA); note 135 and accompanying text
(providing Senator Grassley’s reasoning for creating the Goals 2000 amendment to the
PPRA); and note 146 and accompanying text (providing Senator Shelby’s intentions behind
the No Child Act’s amendment to the PPRA).
229
230
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Originally, the PPRA was designed to provide both parents and
children protection from nonacademic testing in the classroom.236
Nearly thirty years later, however, the PPRA stands on unstable ground
due to three primary causes: (1) the Supreme Court’s decision in
Gonzaga, concluding that FERPA does not provide private persons a
right of action; (2) Congress’ omission to effectively eliminate the
statute’s primary loophole; and (3) the statute’s enforcement provision,
which only provides the Secretary of Education with authority to
regulate possible violations.237 First, the Supreme Court’s holding in
Gonzaga, denying any judicial relief to parents under FERPA, afforded
the ultimate setback for the PPRA.238 Because of Gonzaga, parents with
potentially viable claims will only be able to turn to the Secretary of
Education to look for relief.239 Second, Congress’ continued failure to
revise the wording of subsection (b) leaves the law bereft of any sound
help for parents.240 Thus, if Congress does not amend subsection (b) to
eliminate the word “required,” the law will forever fail to provide
families any sound protection.241 Third, because Congress centralized
the statute’s enforcement provision around the Secretary of Education,
the power of the provision is weak because no one person, or group of
persons, can adequately regulate an entire Nation of schools.242 As a
result, parents who believe a PPRA violation has occurred in their child’s
school are left with few options to find relief.
Accordingly, this Part of the Note will first address the judicial
system’s inevitable effect on the PPRA and what, if any, aid parents can
now find after the Supreme Court’s holding in Gonzaga.243 Second, this
Part will discuss Congress’ failure to correct the PPRA’s linguistic
loophole, surfacing around the word “required” in subsection (b), which

236
See supra Part II.D; see also supra notes 119-25 and accompanying text (outlining
Senator Hatch’s objective in creating in PPRA).
237
See infra Part III.A-C.
238
See infra Part III.A; see also infra notes 247-52 and accompanying text (comparing
FERPA and the PPRA).
239
See infra Part III.A; see also infra note 267 (quoting Justice Stevens’ opinion in Gonzaga
about the amount of discretion held by the Department of Education in determining
whether or not to investigate a parent’s complaint).
240
See infra Part III.B; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1232h (1982); 20 U.S.C. § 1232h (1994); 20
U.S.C.A. § 1232h (West Supp. 2004).
241
See infra Part III.B; see also infra notes 268-78 and accompanying text (illustrating how
public schools evade the PPRA through this loophole).
242
See infra Part III.C; see also infra notes 279-84 (highlighting the Goals 2000 enactment of
its enforcement provision and its office and review board provision).
243
See infra Part III.A.
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destroys many viable PPRA complaints.244 And finally, this Part will
illustrate that because the PPRA only grants power to the Secretary of
Education, thereby failing to delegate that power to the states, the overall
purpose of the enforcement provision is ineffective.245
A. The Judicial System’s Effect on the PPRA
Due to the PPRA’s and FERPA’s indisputable parallels, the Court’s
recent treatment of FERPA has one inescapable consequence with regard
to the PPRA—the statute will be void of any judicial relief for parents
and students. In 2002, the United States Supreme Court determined in
Gonzaga that a § 1983 claim only provides protection when a right
guaranteed by the Constitution or one clearly expressed by Congress is
violated.246 As a result, Chief Justice Rehnquist and the majority
invalidated FERPA under a § 1983 claim, concluding that it does not
provide private citizens with enforceable rights.247 Although Gonzaga’s
opinion focused strictly on FERPA, its relationship with its sister statute
is undeniable.
FERPA and PPRA share a similar congressional history.248 Both
were originally enacted in the 1970s, through Congress’ spending power,
for the same general purpose: to afford protection to parents and
students for privacy violations by public schools, or more specifically, by
outside researchers.249 In fact, when FERPA was originally designed, it
contained a provision that premised the overall purpose of the PPRA.250
In addition, both statutes mandate that public schools comply with
specific provisions regarding such things as parental inspection of
materials, parental consent for release of records or permission to
conduct surveys, and parental notice of rights under both.251 Most
importantly, both FERPA and the PPRA only confer a right on the
Secretary of the Department of Education to inspect possible

See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part III.C.
246
536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002); see supra Part II.C.
247
Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 287; see also American Civil Liberties Union, Your Right to Keep
Your School Records Private, at http://www.aclu.org/StudentsRights/StudentsRights.cfm?
ID=13152&c=161 (last modified July 17, 2003).
248
Compare 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (1976) (illustrating FERPA in its original form) with 20
U.S.C. § 1232h (1982) (illustrating the PPRA in its original form).
249
See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text (outlining the history of FERPA); see also
Part II.D (outlining the history of the PPRA).
250
See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
251
See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2000) and 20 U.S.C.A. § 1232h (West Supp. 2004).
244
245
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violations.252 Thus, because of these similarities, a valid assumption can
be made that how the Supreme Court treats one statute, it will treat the
other.
Although the Supreme Court has yet to analyze the PPRA as it has
FERPA, the future of the PPRA in the judicial system is inevitable. One
example of Gonzaga’s foreseeable effect appears in Fields v. Palmdale
School District.253 In Fields, a volunteer children’s mental health counselor
at an elementary school approached her school district about giving a
psychological survey to its first, third, and fifth graders.254 The school
board conceded, and asked the counselor to send consent forms home
with the students.255 Although the letters contained a warning that
“answering questions may make [a] child feel uncomfortable,” the actual
content of the survey was not disclosed.256
On the survey’s scheduled day of administration students were
asked various sexual inquiries, such as “to rate the frequency of the
following activities on a scale from ‘never’ to ‘almost all the time,’”
including the following:
(8) Touching my private parts too much
...
(17) Thinking about having sex
...
(23) Thinking about sex when I don’t want to
...

See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2000) and 20 U.S.C.A. § 1232h (West Supp. 2004).
271 F. Supp. 2d 1217 (C.D. Cal. 2003). The plaintiffs in the action were parents of
public school, elementary-aged children. The defendants included Palmdale School
District, the District’s Director of Psychological Services, the elementary school principle,
and the mental health counselor. Id. at 1218.
254
Id. at 1217. The counselor sent letters home with the children specifically asking
parents for “‘support in participating in a district wide [sic] study of our first, third and
fifth grade children,’ and stated that the study was ‘part of a collaborative effort with The
California School of Professional Psychology . . . , [the] Children’s Bureau of Southern
California[,] and the Palmdale School District.’” Id. at 1219 (alteration in orginal).
255
Id. at 1217.
256
Id. at 1219 (alteration in original). At no point prior to the survey’s distribution were
any parents informed of the survey’s content. Id. However, only two parents withdrew
their child from having to take the survey. Id. The record indicates, nevertheless, that, had
the parents “known the true nature of the Survey, none of the parents would have
consented to their children’s involvement.” Id. The only reason the other parents did not
withdraw their children is because they relied on the school districts representations. Id.
252
253
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(44) Having sex feelings in my body.257
After the survey’s completion and its true content was revealed,
parents filed a claim against the school board, which included a violation
of their constitutional right of privacy and a § 1983 federal civil rights
claim.258
In his analysis, Judge Selna focused primarily on the
constitutional claim.259 He ultimately concluded that the Fourteenth
Amendment’s fundamental deference to parents does not permit them to
control a public school curriculum “because they have chosen to send their
children to public school.”260 Although the court briefly discussed the
§ 1983 claim, it recognized that since no constitutional or statutory right
had been violated, the parents could not make a prima facie case under
§ 1983.261 As a result, their claims were dismissed.262

257
Id. at 1219-20. Other questions included the following: “(22) Thinking about touching
other people’s private parts; (26) Washing myself because I feel dirty on the inside; (34) Not
trusting people because they might want sex; (40) Getting scared or upset when I think
about sex; (47) Can’t stop thinking about sex; (54) Getting upset when people talk about
sex.” Id. These questions were taken directly from the Fields opinion.
258
Id. at 1220. In all, the parents’ complaint asserted four causes of action: (1) violations
of their federal constitutional right to privacy; (2) violations of their state constitutional
right to privacy; (3) deprivation of their civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (4)
negligence. Id.
259
Id. at 1220-23.
260
Id. at 1223 (emphasis added) (citing Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Prod., Inc., 68 F.3d
525, 533-34 (1st Cir. 1995) (arguing that parents cannot tell schools what to teach their
children)). The court determined, in a footnote, that the parents’ true complaint was
grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Substantive Due Process Clause. Id. at 1220 n.4.
Accordingly, the court recharacterized the privacy claims as substantive due process claims
because the parents did not “connect their asserted interest in ‘control[ling] the upbringing
of their children by introducing them to matters of and relating to sex in accordance with
their personal and religious values and beliefs,’ to the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, or
Tenth Amendments.” Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted). The analysis stressed
that “the right established in Meyer and Pierce to direct the education of one’s children does
not give parents the right to ‘control the upbringing of their children by introducing them
to matters of and relating to sex in accordance with their personal and religious values and
beliefs,’ contrary to the Parents’ assertions.” Id. at 1223. In sum, the court recognized the
Meyer-Pierce principle that parents have a fundamental right to direct their children’s
education; however, the court concluded that the Substantive Due Process Clause is not
absolute, and does not protect these parents’ claim of liberty. Id.
261
Id. The court stated that to assert a § 1983 violation, the plaintiffs must prove that the
defendants (1) violated a “clearly established” statutory or constitutional right, and (2)
were acting “under color of state law” when it committed the alleged violation. Id. at 1223
(internal citations omitted).
262
Id. at 1223-24. In the end, the court dismissed the parents’ federal privacy and § 1983
claims for failure to state a cause of action and dismissed the state privacy and negligence
claims, without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (allowing district courts to decline to
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Fields is highly relevant for one very important reason: Neither
party, nor the court, raises the PPRA.263 Clearly, the survey’s content fits
within the PPRA’s scope as well as the survey’s audience—a group of
innocent six, eight, and ten year olds. However, the PPRA was never
addressed. This omission, by both the parents’ attorney and the court,
can only be attributed to Gonzaga’s holding on FERPA. In fact, the only
plausible interpretation of why neither party nor the court raised the
PPRA as a viable claim is because of Gonzaga’s finding that FERPA
lacked the “rights-creating” language to substantiate a claim under
§ 1983.264 For instance, if Gonzaga’s majority had reached the same
conclusion as Justice Stevens in the dissent, finding that FERPA does
grant rights to private persons, then, more likely than not, the PPRA
would have been raised in Fields.265
The Fields decision, consequently, is immediate proof of Gonzaga’s
effect on the PPRA. More importantly, it represents the foreshadowing
of an inevitably long line of cases where the PPRA, a statute enacted to
prevent inappropriate surveys, will be ignored as void. Now, parents
confronted with a possible PPRA violation will only have one place to
turn for help: the Department of Education.266 And, because the PPRA
gives the Department of Education complete discretion in reviewing
complaints and also does not guarantee “access to a formal
administrative proceeding,” parents, such as Mr. and Mrs. Wilson, will
have to accept the fact that they are truly unable to protect their children
from turning into the state’s experimental guinea pigs.267

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim if the court has dismissed all claims over
which it has original jurisdiction).
263
See generally id.
264
See supra notes 196-26 and accompanying text (discussing Gonzaga).
265
See supra notes 221-25 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Stevens’ dissenting
opinion).
266
By completely restricting a person’s private right to sue under § 1983, “the Court
relaxed the pressure on schools to closely adhere to FERPA guidelines.” Warf, supra note
116, at 202.
267
Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 298 (Stevens, J. dissenting). In Gonzaga, Justice
Stevens said that “FERPA provides no guaranteed access to a formal administrative
proceeding or to federal judicial review; rather, it leaves to administrative discretion the
decision whether to follow up on individual complaints.” Id. Consequently, because
FERPA does not guarantee access to the Department of Education, a valid assumption can
be made that neither does the PPRA.
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B. The Legislature’s Failure to Amend the PPRA’s Loophole
Congress enacted the PPRA, as well as its two major amendments, to
protect parents and their children from invasive surveys that are
distributed in public schools.268 However, since the PPRA’s official
enactment in 1978, the statute has been flawed. When Senator Hatch
introduced the statute, subsection (b) possessed one very specific
loophole, which allows any elementary and secondary school that
violates the statute to dodge most parental complaints.269 Specifically,
because Congress incorporated the word “required” in subsection (b),
any school that distributes a survey to its students, without first getting
parental consent, can escape the PPRA entirely if it asserts that the
survey’s administration was voluntary.270 Furthermore, schools can
invoke this argument after the survey’s distribution, even if they failed to
tell the students it was voluntary before they completed it.
Since the PPRA’s creation in 1978, the Act has read, “[n]o student
shall be required, as part of any applicable program, to submit to a
survey, analysis, or evaluation that reveals information concerning
. . .”271 This phrase, which preludes subsection (b), creates a loophole for
researchers by mandating that only those surveys requiring students to
participate be the only surveys that require parental consent.
Consequently, if a school simply calls a survey voluntary, both the
school and the researchers avoid having to deal with parents entirely.
Thus, by following the PPRA’s express language, schools can evade the
statute in its entirety.
The “required” requirement, which Congress has overlooked for
nearly thirty years, provides the easiest escape for schools that want to
distribute a “how do you feel” kind of survey. For example, in 2002,
sixth through twelfth graders in Vigo County, Indiana, were compelled
to take an “Alcohol, Tobacco, and Other Drug Use Survey.”272 The
See supra notes 119-24 and accompanying text (providing Senator Hatch’s intentions
behind the enactment of the PPRA); notes 135-139 and accompanying text (providing
Senator Grassley’s reasoning for creating the Goals 2000 amendment to the PPRA); and
notes 144-47 and accompanying text (providing Senator Shelby’s intentions behind the No
Child Act’s amendment to the PPRA).
269
See 20 U.S.C. § 1232h (1982); 20 U.S.C § 1232h (1994); and 20 U.S.C.A. § 1232h (West
Supp. 2004).
270
See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1232h(b) (West Supp. 2004).
271
20 U.S.C.A. § 1232h(b) (West Supp. 2004) (emphasis added). Compare 20 U.S.C.
§ 1232h(b) (1982) with 20 U.S.C.A. § 1232h(b) (West Supp. 2004).
272
Parental Rights Myths, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2002, at A16, available at 2002 WL 2906120.
The Vigo county school board allowed the survey’s administration because it was
268
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children were asked, “How many times in the last two weeks have you
had five or more alcoholic drinks (beer, wine, liquor) at a sitting,” and,
“If you have ever used these drugs, at what age did you first use
them?”273 After the survey’s administration, Vigo County avoided the
PPRA and its challenges by protesting that their survey was voluntary.274
Thus, despite the PPRA’s intention to require parental consent before a
social survey is administered in class, schools are avoiding the statute
altogether by simply calling their surveys voluntary.
In addition to Indiana, other states are mirroring the survey charade,
and thus, compounding the problem. In April 2003, ten thousand
Fairfax County, Virginia, sixth, eighth, tenth, and twelfth graders were
scheduled to take a 169-question survey asking, “How old were you
when you first had sex?;” “Have you ever had oral sex?;” and “The last
time you had sexual intercourse, what one method did you or your
partner use to prevent pregnancy?”275 Like the survey in Vigo County,
Indiana, the school districts argued that students had the option not to
participate in the survey.276 Unfortunately, Indiana and Virginia are not
threatened with having $500,000 withdrawn from a drug-prevention program if it did not
get 90% of its students to take the survey. Id. A group known as the Indiana Prevention
Resource Center helped the Vigo county school board make the surveys voluntary and
anonymous. Id.
273
Id. The drugs listed included, among other things, snuff, marijuana, cocaine, crack,
inhalants, heroin, and steroids. Id.
274
Id. The Washington Times article stated that the primary reason of why the survey
was given to the students on a voluntary basis is because the Indiana Prevention Resource
Center recognized that when parental consent is required “participation rates drop
dramatically.” Id. Thus, the Prevention center would argue that its research is skewed
because not all the children are able to participate when parents exercise their right to
decide what is best for their child. Id.
275
Archibald, supra note 127; see Jon Ward, Fairfax Pulls the Plug on Student Sex Survey,
WASH. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2003, at B01, available at 2003 WL 7710011. The survey contained
more than sex questions, which would have only been administered to the tenth and
twelfth graders. Ward, supra. In fact, a similar survey had been administered two years
prior without the sexual questions. Id. The survey was part of a program promoted by
Michele Ridge, the national spokeswoman for Communities That Care (“CTC”).
Archibald, supra note 127 (Ridge is the wife of President Bush’s director of homeland
security). CTC has “developed the youth survey used in more than 400 communities
nationwide to collect personal information from students to help local governments justify
federal and foundation grant applications.” Id.
276
Id. The county school board voted on whether or not to permit the survey, which
resulted in a 8-4 vote along party lines: Democrats favoring and Republicans opposing the
survey’s administration. Id. Daniel Carmody, the vice-president of Channing Bete, the
Massachusetts-based firm that developed the data-gathering program emphasized that
“The survey is a voluntary survey. But we can’t control if a particular teacher gives
students the impression that they have to answer the survey, then a parent gets upset. We
can’t assume responsibility for that . . . .” Ward, supra note 275. Ultimately, Channing Bete
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alone; schools in Minnesota, Ohio, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, and Texas have all recently distributed impermissible
surveys hiding behind the “required” requirement.277 This loophole is
used by school districts all over the United States to defeat valid
complaints by parents and will continue until this federal law is revised.
Thus, unless legislative action is taken to amend this portion of the
original PPRA, the “required” requirement will continue to override the
PPRA’s intended purpose to obtain parental consent.
In the end, Congress has failed the PPRA’s intended audience
through its continuous failure to repair the “required” requirement.
Currently, those schools that want to earn an extra dollar by testing their
elementary and secondary students on inappropriate material can easily
do so by using the “required” requirement to their advantage. As a
result, parents like Mr. and Mrs. Wilson will not be able to stop schools
from violating their right to choose what is best for their child;
consequently, little Wendy, as well as her second grade class, will have
to continue answering inappropriate sex questions.278 Without serious
legislative action, this statute will continue to impair a parent’s right to
decide, will allow impermissible testing on children, and will do nothing
more than take up space in the United States Code.
C. The Ineffectiveness of the PPRA’s Enforcement Provision
The PPRA’s current enforcement provision, enacted nearly ten years
ago, is inadequate. When Congress created this provision, it only
granted supervisory power to the Secretary of Education to manage all
decided against the survey’s administration out of fear of being sued. Id. However, had
the survey not been pulled by the research company, the PPRA would not have prevented
its distribution.
277
HB-Rights, The Protection of Pupil Rights Amendment (“PPRA”), at http://www.hbrights.org/5parents/ppra (last visited Sept. 3, 2003); see also Gretchen McKay, Parents Fear
School Survey Could Lead to Trouble, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Apr. 10, 2000, at A1,
available at 2000 WL 10893433. For example, the survey given in Mahtomedi, Minnesota
was to high school freshmen boys and girls and called an Assessment For Bias. HB-Rights,
supra. The students were questioned whether or not they are biased “toward straight
people or against gay people.” Id. In Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on the other hand, the
statewide youth survey, which has been administered to students in grades six through
twelve since 1989, focuses on drug use and crime. McKay, supra. One reason that
Pennsylvania permits such surveys to be given in their schools derives from the amount of
grant money they receive. Id. For example, “since 1995, $122 million has been given to
Pennsylvania schools for safety and violence prevention programs.” Id. Thus, the
condition is placed on Pennsylvania schools that if they want the money, they must
conduct the surveys.
278
See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
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alleged PPRA complaints.279 However, because the Secretary and his
review board cannot possibly evaluate all the complaints sent to
Washington, many of the complaints that parents file with the
Department are overlooked.280
In 1994, Congress first introduced the enforcement provision to the
PPRA in the Goals 2000 Act.281 The Goals 2000 enforcement amendment
obligated the Secretary of Education “to take such action as the Secretary
determines appropriate to enforce” the statute.282 Accordingly, the
Secretary was granted complete discretion in how he or she wanted to
regulate the PPRA.283 In addition to the enforcement amendment, the
Goals 2000 Act created a provision compelling the Secretary of Education
to create an office and review board “within the Department of
Education to investigate, process, review, and adjudicate violations of
the rights” contained within this statute.284 The Secretary thus formed
the Family Policy Compliance Office (“FPCO”), a group of persons who
See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1232h (1994).
See generally 140 CONG. REC. 1220 (1994). When Senator Grassley presented the Goals
2000 amendment to his colleagues, he introduced a letter he had written to then Secretary
of Education, Richard W. Riley as well as Mr. Riley’s response. Id. One of the questions
Senator Grassley asked Mr. Riley was how many PPRA complaints had been filed with the
Department. Id. Mr. Riley replied that the office had received “numerous” complaints
since the statute’s promulgation. Id. However, he continued by stating that if a complaint
did not follow certain procedural guidelines, it was dismissed. Id. When Senator Grassley
questioned how many parental complaints had been dismissed because of the mandated
procedures, Mr. Riley responded that “Our records are not kept in such a way that we can
provide this information.” Id.
281
See 20 U.S.C. § 1232h(d) (1994).
282
Id. Specifically, subsection (d) provided the following:
The Secretary shall take such action as the Secretary determines
appropriate to enforce this section, except that action to terminate
assistance provided under an applicable program shall be taken only if
the Secretary determines that - (1) there has been a failure to comply
with such section; and (2) compliance with such section cannot be
secured by voluntary means.
Id.
283
See generally id. In Gonzaga, Justice Stevens declared that “FERPA provides no
guaranteed access to a formal administrative proceeding or to federal judicial review;
rather, it leaves to administrative discretion the decision whether to follow up on individual
complaints.” Gonzaga v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 298 (2002) (Stevens, J. dissenting) (emphasis
added). Consequently, because this Note has established the indisputable similarities
between FERPA and the PPRA, Justice Stevens’ statement can also be extended to the
PPRA.
284
See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1232h(e) (1994). Subsection (e) states the following: “The
Secretary shall establish or designate an office and review board within the Department of
Education to investigate, process, review, and adjudicate violations of the rights
established under this section.” Id.
279
280
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receive and review parental complaints from across the Nation and are
located in Washington, D.C.285
However, despite the Goals 2000 enforcement and review board
amendments, the PPRA is weak. Instead of public schools being forced
to follow the statute’s provisions, they are unmotivated to do so,
knowing that there exists only a small likelihood they will be punished if
they somehow violate the PPRA’s guidelines.286
Because the Goals 2000 Act established that only the Secretary can
enforce the PPRA’s provisions, a public school that fails to follow the
statute’s provisions has a great possibility of avoiding punishment for
U.S. Department of Education, Family Policy Compliance Office (“FPCO”), available at
http://www.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/index.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2003). The
sole purpose surrounding the FPCO’s creation was to ensure student and parental rights
through the PPRA and FERPA. Id. Thus, if parents believe that a PPRA violation has
occurred at his or her child’s school, or if the state educational agencies or local educational
agencies failed to directly notify a parent, that parent’s only possible remedy is to file a
compliant with the FPCO. Id. Once a complaint is filed, the group must review the
allegations to determine if a violation has truly happened. Id. Ultimately, if the FPCO
concludes that the reported school district has, in fact, violated the PPRA, the Department
of Education must withdraw that district’s federal funding. Id.
286
One reason why public schools are unmotivated to comply with the PPRA’s
provisions is because of the overly burdensome procedure for parents who want to file a
complaint with the FPCO. For example, when Senator Grassley wrote to Richard Riley, the
former Secretary of Education, he asked what the filing procedures entailed for parents.
140 CONG. REC. 1219 (1994). Mr. Riley replied that the FPCO is only required to investigate
a complaint if the following conditions are met:
(1) The activity that is the subject of the complaint is supported with
funds supplied, in whole or in part, by the U.S. Department of
Education.
(2) The complainant is either a parent or guardian of a student, or the
student if an adult or emancipated minor, who is directly affected
by the activity.
(3) The activity meets the definition of psychiatric or psychological
examination, test, or treatment . . . of the regulations.
(4) The primary purpose of the activity is to reveal any of the
information listed in . . . [the CFR].
(5) The school district or other recipient of funds has not obtained
prior written consent of the student’s parent.
(6) The complainant has attempted to resolve the apparent conflict at the
appropriate local and State levels (if a State complaint procedure
exists) before filing the complaint with the Department.
Id. (emphasis added to suggest possible loopholes for the procedural guidelines). The first
provision listed above is no longer required following the enactment of the No Child Left
Behind Act. See No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425, 208388 (2002); see also supra notes 144-59 and accompanying text (discussing the No Child Act
amendments).
285
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two reasons: (1) because no one person, or select group, can effectively
control, and regulate, all of the Nation’s public schools; and (2) as
discussed above, because the PPRA does not allow parental access to the
judicial system, schools will be less motivated to comply with the
PPRA’s provisions because they know that unless the FPCO catches their
violation, they will not be punished.287 Thus, unless the PPRA is
amended to provide a system of more localized regulation, one better
capable of controlling the public schools, many public schools will “fall
through the cracks” and never be forced to comply with the statute’s
provisions.
Under the current form of the PPRA, the enforcement provision does
not adequately regulate the country’s public schools. For example, in
1994 when Senator Grassley was pleading with his colleagues to accept
his Goals 2000 amendment, he proved the PPRA’s weakness by
illustrating that in eight years, only seventeen complaints had been
investigated by the FPCO out of the many complaints filed with the group
during that period.288 In addition, as of 2002, the FPCO had only
withdrawn one school’s funding as a result of a PPRA violation—almost
twenty-five years after the statute’s enactment.289 Thus, because the
FPCO does not have the manpower to properly evaluate all of the
Nation’s public schools, the PPRA must be amended.
The current PPRA enforcement provision does not provide a
sufficient review of the public school system. For instance, if a school
abuses the PPRA’s provisions by administering a social survey to their
students, violating subsection (b) of the statute, it has a greater likelihood
than not of going unpunished.290 Additionally, if a school abuses the
PPRA by not complying with the notification procedures, violating
subsection (c) of the statute, the violation will probably never be
noticed.291 Furthermore, without schools feeling a threat of punishment,
they will not be deterred from conducting the same types of invasive
surveys in the future.292 Therefore, Congress needs to amend the PPRA
See supra Part III.A.
140 CONG. REC. S846-01, 862; see supra notes 133-43 and accompanying text.
289
See C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 146 F. Supp. 2d 528 (D.N.J. 2001); see also supra
note 187 (explaining the FPCO’s notice to the Ridgewood board of education).
290
See supra note 153 (displaying subsection (b) in its entirety).
291
See supra note 156 (displaying subsection (c) in part).
292
See generally Part III.B. Part III.B discusses recent surveys that have been administered
to students in various states, proving that this survey problem still fervently exists.
Accordingly, this Part also confirms that schools do not believe they will be penalized for
distributing an invasive survey because they are still actively distributing surveys.
287
288
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to extend the Secretary of Education’s power into the states, mandating
that the state educational agencies observe and review each of the public
schools in its geographical region.293
In the end, the PPRA’s enforcement provision is ineffective. The
provision’s key obstruction is that all of the statute’s power rests in the
hands of one person, the Secretary of Education. This statute needs a
more localized enforcement system, not to eliminate surveys entirely,
but to ensure that parents are aware of the survey’s existence and have
consented to their child participating in that survey. Without this type of
enforcement system, the Meyer-Pierce principle will continue to be lost,
parents such as Mr. and Mrs. Wilson will continue to be overlooked as
their child’s primary decision-makers, and a parent’s freedom of
intimate association with his or her child will continue to be violated.294
Thus, in addition to amending the statute to provide access to the
judicial system and to eliminate the “required” requirement, the statute
must be amended to delegate the Secretary’s power onto the states in
order to provide a greater system of regulation and to provide better
protection for families.295
The current status of the PPRA is an illusion, cruelly misleading
parents into believing it will protect children from invasive surveys in
their schools, the type of surveys that interrupt the primary purpose of
the classroom: to learn. Therefore, unless the PPRA is amended to
create access to the judicial system, to eliminate its linguistic loophole
found in the word “required,” and to localize its form of regulation, the
personal rights of families, such as the Wilsons, will be neglected.296
Furthermore, without these new legislative revisions, parents will be
forced to watch their children’s education depart from reading, writing,
and arithmetic to sex, drugs, and suicide.
IV. IF AT FIRST YOU DON’T SUCCEED, TRY, TRY AGAIN—PROPOSED REDRAFT
OF THE PPRA
Dear Senator Grassley: . . . We must enact much stronger
legislation at the local, State, and Federal levels of our country
See infra Part IV. See generally 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400, 1411 (2000).
See supra Part II.A-C. Part II.A focuses on the Meyer-Pierce principle that all parents
have a fundamental right to direct the upbringing of their children. Part II.C concentrates
on a parent’s right of intimate association with his children. See also infra Part IV.
295
See supra Part III.A-B. Part III.A discusses the judicial system’s treatment of the PPRA,
where as Part III.B analyzes Congress’ failure in amending the PPRA’s primary loophole.
296
See supra notes 10-18 and accompanying text.
293
294
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to halt this invasion of our homes. Will the passing of new
laws, or the strengthening of existing ones, stop the sapping of
time from true “academics”? . . . No[,]* * * but what it can do
is to stop the erosion of our rights and freedoms, the rest of
what ails the learning community will be taken care of in the
home, at local board meetings and at the polls * * * We, the
parents, are taking our schools back.297
In 1978, the PPRA’s original design was simple—it would aid
parents in regulating what nonacademic material their children were
exposed to at school.298 In fact, Congress asserted that its purpose of
enacting such a statute was to ensure the constitutional right granted to
parents to direct the upbringing of their children.299 With each
amendment, legislation has repeatedly affirmed to help guard the
parent-child relationship, yet the PPRA does not provide such assistance
to families.300 Instead, the PPRA is a greater hardship on parents, teasing
them into believing that the statute can help protect their elementary and
secondary-aged children.301 Despite the thirty years of congressional
attempts to amend the statute, the PPRA is powerless because of
Gonzaga’s holding, denying all access to the judicial system, because of
its linguistic loophole and its centralized standard of enforcement.
Thus, in following the PPRA’s original intentions, parents should be
given the opportunity to decide if their children participate in
nonacademic testing in public schools. The law was never created to
altogether stop these kinds of surveys, which would be difficult since
many of these invasive surveys are federally funded, but it should at a
minimum, provide parents with what it was initially created to do—
make schools obtain parental consent.302 This Note proposes an
amendment that corrects the three primary faults of the current PPRA,
granting those parents who want the right, the ability to shield their
children from inappropriate surveys in the classroom.

140 CONG. REC. 1221 (1994) (statement in a letter by Jane F. Ponn, concerned parent, to
Senator Grassley).
298
See supra Part II.D.
299
See supra Part II.D. See generally 124 CONG. REC. 27,423 (1978).
300
See supra Part III. See generally 147 CONG. REC. S13365-07 (2001); 140 CONG. REC. S84601.
301
See supra Part III; see also 140 CONG. REC. S846-01 (containing many letters written by
concerned parents, who do not know how to protect their children from invasive
questioning).
302
As briefly discussed, the author believes that Congress should consider, at minimum,
a strict ban on surveys in elementary schools. See supra note 24.
297
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PROPOSED PROVISIONS TO BE CHANGED OR ADDED TO THE
PROTECTION OF THE PUPILS RIGHT STATUTE 303
Section 1: Parental rights concerning nonacademic testing304
(b) No student attending a public school shall [be required,
as part of any applicable program, to] submit to a
survey, analysis, or evaluation that reveals information
concerning:
(1) political affiliations;
(2) mental
and
psychological
problems
potentially embarrassing to the student or
his family;
(3) sex behavior and attitudes; illegal, antisocial, self-incriminating and demeaning
behavior; critical appraisals of other
individuals with whom respondents have
close
family
relationships;
legally
recognized privileged and analogous
relationships, such as those of lawyers,
physicians, and ministers; or religious
practices, affiliations, or beliefs of the
student or student’s parent; or income
(other than that required by law to
determine eligibility for participation in a
program or for receiving financial
assistance under such program)
without the prior consent of the student (if the student is
an adult or emancipated minor), or in the case of
unemancipated minor, without the prior written consent
of the parent.

303
The proposed statute is not a new form of the PPRA. Instead, the proposed
provisions are amendments to the existing PPRA. The provisions in regular font are the
current provisions with revisions that the author suggests be made to the current statute.
The provisions in italicized font, on the other hand, are amendments to be supplemented to
the current statute.
304
Section one begins with subsection (b) of the current statute. 20 U.S.C.A. 1232h(b)
(West Supp. 2004). Subsection (a) of the current PPRA will not be discussed. In order to
make the alterations in this provision effective, subsection (e) of the current statute, which
gives the Secretary of Education sole control over the statute, would have to be eliminated.
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Commentary:
Section one is taken in large part from the current version of the
PPRA. However, the “required” element is eliminated, thus mandating
parental consent for both “required” and “non-required” surveys. Also,
this section eliminates the phrase “as part of any applicable program.”
Through this abolition, this section will no longer be under the sole
control of the Secretary of the Department of Education. Instead, in its
absence, private individuals will be able to sue under § 1983, and the
Supreme Court’s holding in Gonzaga will no longer control.
Additionally, the central arguments in the New Jersey case, C.N., would
be rendered moot.305
Section 1(a): Relief 306
If the student is an unemancipated minor and takes a survey
containing one of the eight (8) above topics and does not
receive a consent form from the school to obtain parental
consent, that student’s parent(s) and/or legal guardian shall
have the authority to proceed in his or her choice of action.307
Commentary:
This provision entitles an individual the right of access to the judicial
system.
As noted in the first section, the phrase, “as part of any
applicable program” was removed to eliminate the Secretary’s sole
control over this section. Now, pursuant to §§ 1 and 1(a), a parent forced
305
If the PPRA eliminates the “any applicable program” phrase, then the provision
would have to also be amended in FERPA, granting both statutes functional under § 1983.
306
This provision, as well as the next, would follow subsection (b), yet would prelude
subsection (c).
307
The parent’s “choice of action” is strictly dependent upon when a parent is acting. For
example, if a parent wants to seek relief because a social survey has already been
administered in his child’s public school without his consent, that parent must first file a
complaint with the state educational agency. By mandating that the parent first turn to the
state agency, this eliminates any potential ripeness issue. See Power v. Sch. Bd. of Va.
Beach, 276 F. Supp. 2d 515, 521 (E.D. Va. 2003) (“For a case to be ripe, it must involve ‘an
administrative decision [which] has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way
by the challenging parties.’”) (alteration in original) (citations omitted); see also Pac. Gas &
Elec. v. Energy Res. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 200 (1983); Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S.
136 (1967). But, if the state agency reviews and investigates the complaint, concluding that
no PPRA violation occurred in the school, the parent can then file a complaint in district
court. The court will then review the school’s actions and determine if the parent is
entitled to monetary relief resulting from a PPRA violation. Alternatively, if a parent
wants to stop a social survey from being distributed in his or her child’s school, that parent
may first file a complaint in the district court to obtain injunctive relief.
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to use the PPRA will have enforceable rights to access the courts through
a § 1983 civil rights claim.308
Section 1(b): Relief
If the school provides consent forms for the students to return
with their parent’s signature and the student neglects to do so,
the school may not administer the examination, testing, or
treatment to that student. If the school proceeds with the
examination, that student’s parent(s) and/or legal guardian
shall have authority to proceed in his or her choice of action.309
Commentary:
This provision is designed ultimately to ensure that parents will be
notified and will consent to any social research before their children
participate. Furthermore, a school will potentially face liability if it
either fails to provide consent forms to the parents, but also if it
administers the testing material without the consent forms being
returned. Thus, a school’s possible assertion that “it did its job by giving
the forms” or “we can’t be responsible for parents who don’t return the
slips” will be denied.
Section 2: Enforcement 310
The Secretary of Education shall mandate that state
educational agencies create an office and review board within
its own agency to regulate this statute.311

308
See supra note 307. Post distribution of a survey, a parent will only be able to file suit
if he or she has exhausted his or her claim at the state level.
309
See supra note 307.
310
This proposed section would replace subsection (f) of the current statute, which
establishes the Secretary’s duty to create an office and review board within his own
Department. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1232h(f) (West Supp. 2004).
311
This type of delegation mimics the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(“IDEA”). See generally 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400, 1411 (2000). Under IDEA, Congress created the
more centralized form of regulation, knowing that more children would benefit. Id. In fact,
Congress stated that the federal government needed “to assist States, localities, educational
service agencies, and Federal agencies to provide for the education of all children with
disabilities.” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(c). Thus, in applying the same principles as in IDEA,
Congress needs to amend the PPRA’s enforcement provision to “be responsive to the
growing needs of an increasingly more diverse society. A more equitable allocation of
resources is essential for the Federal Government to meet its responsibility to provide an
equal educational opportunity for all individuals.” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(7)(A).
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Commentary:
This proposed amendment eliminates subsection (e) of the current
statute, which controls the statute’s enforcement.312 Now, instead of the
Secretary of Education having sole control over the statute and its
enforcement terms, this provision delegates the Secretary’s power
among the states to review and investigate complaints filed by parents.
Section 2(a): Duties of the Secretary
The Secretary shall create an office and review board to:
(i) Supervise the state educational agencies to
ensure that each agency follows its assigned
duties; and
(ii) Allocate the designated federal grants to each
state agency.313
Commentary:
This provision is designed to establish the Secretary of Education’s
duties under the PPRA. In comparison to the Goals 2000 review board
provision, this proposed amendment allows the Secretary to remain as
the chief administrator of the statute’s operations; however, his power to
enforce the statute is delegated to the states. In addition, the Secretary
will distribute the designated grant money to the states for the states to
then distribute to the schools. This delegation of power will ultimately
benefit both the FPCO and parents. First, it will help the FPCO because
the group simply does not have the ability to adequately observe and
review all of the Nation’s public schools. Consequently, schools were
going unchecked and valid PPRA complaints unnoticed. Second,
parents will have a better chance of obtaining relief because the states are
better able to do a more thorough job of evaluating complaints because
they will receive substantially fewer than the federal group did overall.

312
Subsection (f) currently states: “The Secretary shall establish or designate an office
and review board within the Department of Education to investigate, process, review, and
adjudicate violations of the rights established under this section.” 20 U.S.C.A. § 1232h(f)
(West Supp. 2004).
313
See supra note 311 (discussing how the PPRA’s proposed revisions mimic the
provisions of IDEA). The first phrase under IDEA’s funding provision states, “The
Secretary shall make grants to States and the outlying areas, and provide funds to the
Secretary of the Interior, to assist them to provide special education and related services to
children with disabilities in accordance with this subchapter.” 20 U.S.C. § 1411(a)(1).
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Section 2(b): Duties of the state educational agencies
The state educational agencies shall:
(i) Supervise the public schools in its designated
region as well as investigate, process, review,
and adjudicate violations of the rights established
under this section; and
(ii) Review each public school in its region to
determine if each school has complied with the
regulations of this statute; and
(iii) Allocate the funds received from the Secretary to
each school that complies with the statute. The
funds will be distributed on a strict contingency
basis. If the agency determines that a school did
not comply with the statute’s regulations, it shall
withhold that school’s educational funds for the
duration of that academic year.
Commentary:
This proposed amendment creates an entirely new method of
enforcement for the PPRA. In contrast to the current statute, this
provision establishes that the state educational agencies have the power
to investigate and review complaints filed by parents. Additionally, this
provision compels state agencies to supervise its designated public
schools, ensuring that the schools are complying with the statute’s
provisions. Also, this amendment institutes a new standard for
allocating funds. Now, instead of the schools automatically receiving a
set amount of money each year, schools will be granted educational
funds on a contingency basis. Therefore, if a school complies with the
PPRA, it will receive the full amount of the funds at the end of the school
year. However, if the school fails to follow the PPRA’s guidelines, it will
be denied only those funds for that school year.314
Overall, the model statute uses the current PPRA as a base but opens
the door for § 1983 claims, eliminates the statute’s primary linguistic
loophole, and creates a more efficient method for reviewing complaints,
as well as distributing funds. First, the statute provides parents with the
option of using the judicial system if their child’s school district has
threatened to administer an inappropriate survey. Second, the statute

314
The denial of funds will only be for the school year in which a PPRA violation
occurred. If the school complies with the PPRA the following academic year, it will again
receive the funds.
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eradicates the “required” requirement, mandating that all nonacademic
surveys receive consent. Third, the proposed amendment shifts the
power of the current PPRA’s enforcement provision onto the states and
grants the state educational agencies control over the public schools.
Thus, the state agencies will have the authority to investigate complaints
as well as distribute funds in accordance with schools’ compliance of the
statute. Accordingly, the PPRA will no longer be problematic but an
enforceable piece of legislation.
The first requirement mandates that all surveys receive parental
consent regardless of whether the survey is required or voluntary.
Therefore, the escape that schools use to dismiss the PPRA’s procedures
will no longer exist. Now, all public educational institutions, such as
that in C.N., will have to face the possibility of a lawsuit if they decide to
distribute a social survey to their minor students without first obtaining
parental consent.315 Thus, this provision eliminates the PPRA’s primary
loophole by abolishing a school’s ability to evade the statute by simply
calling their survey “required.”
The second requirement reopens the door for § 1983 claims.
Through this added provision, in combination with the elimination of
“any applicable program” from the preceding subsection, parents are
given options. Essentially, this provision allows parents the ability to
access the judicial system under a § 1983 claim if they need to obtain
immediate relief.316 Now, parents can use the judicial system as a
primary resource or as a secondary resource depending upon when the
parent is filing the claim. Therefore, instead of parents only being able to
turn to the FPCO, this provision grants them the ability to obtain relief
for themselves and their children through the courts or the government.
The third requirement is an extension of the second. Now, a parent
who wants to file a lawsuit against his child’s school can do so if the
school administers an impermissible survey to their child without
receiving direct, written consent. Thus, this provision obligates schools
to not only send a consent form home with its students, but also to make
sure the consent form is signed and returned before a survey is
distributed. Consequently, this added component guarantees that
parents are aware of a survey’s distribution, as well as ensures that the
school district receives a signed consent form releasing it from future
315
See supra notes 169-86 and accompanying text (discussing C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of
Educ., 146 F. Supp. 2d 528 (D.N.J. 2001)).
316
See supra note 307.
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liability. This provision, thus, protects both parents and school districts
by requiring that each student obtain permission to participate in the
scheduled testing. As a result, all public elementary and secondary
schools that fail to receive proper consent from parents and still coerce
students into answering a survey’s questions could be subject to judicial
scrutiny.
The final three provisions are closely associated. Section two
establishes that instead of the Goals 2000 amendment, which provides
that the Secretary has the single authority to establish a review board
within its federal department, that power is bestowed to the states.317
Thus, the proposed provision combines the principles of the Goals 2000
amendment and also the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act,
redefining the statute to create a more localized system of regulation.318
By creating a more localized system, the complaints filed with the state
agencies will have a better chance of being reviewed because the
agencies will not be as bombarded as the FPCO has been in the past.
Consequently, this proposed amendment, granting enforcement power
to the fifty states, will be more effective for parents than the current
statute that only allows the federal government to act.
Section 2(a) reestablishes the Secretary of Education’s duties under
the PPRA. First, instead of the Secretary controlling all of the Nation’s
public schools, his job is to oversee the state educational agencies,
ensuring that the state agencies are fulfilling their duties. Therefore, the
Secretary no longer has to review the filed complaints because that duty
belongs to the states. Second, the Secretary is to manage and distribute
federal funds solely to the state agencies. Consequently, unless a state
agency violates its duties under the statute or a public school appeals
directly to the Department, forcing the Secretary to act, he should no
longer have any immediate interaction with the public schools.319
Section 2(b) creates a new and stronger method of enforcement for
the PPRA. First, the proposed provision grants all of the Secretary’s
317
As stated above, this proposed provision is premised on the federal to state
regulations in IDEA. See supra note 307. For more information on IDEA, see Rebecca L.
Bouchard, The Relationship Between the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act and Section
1983: Are Compensatory Damages an Available and Appropriate Remedy?, 25 W. NEW ENG. L.
REV. 301 (2003); Joshua Andrew Wolfe, A Search for the Best IDEA: Balancing the Conflicting
Provisions of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1627 (2002).
318
See supra note 311 (discussing how the proposed amendment mimics the IDEA).
319
If a public school allegedly violates the PPRA and the state agency denies it federal
funds, the public school can appeal to the Secretary and the FPCO for review.
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former power to the states. Now, when parents believe a PPRA violation
has occurred in their child’s school, they will turn to the state
educational agencies and not to the FPCO. Second, this amendment
compels state agencies to supervise the public schools in their region to
make certain that the schools are abiding by the statute’s provisions.
Third, this amendment institutes a new standard for allocating funds.
Now, instead of the schools automatically receiving a set amount of
money each year, schools will be granted funds on a contingency
basis.320 If a school complies with the PPRA, it will receive the full
amount of funds promised. But, if the school fails to follow the PPRA’s
guidelines, it will not receive the funds for that school year, and it will be
suspended for the next academic year. That suspension, however, is
subject to review after one year. If the school can prove it followed the
PPRA’s provisions, the suspension will be terminated.321 Thus, this
proposed amendment creates a penalty for those schools that either
knowingly, or negligently, fail to comply with the statute. As a result,
the PPRA is a more efficient statute.
Through the revisions of the model statute, Mr. and Mrs. Wilson will
have the ability to file a claim with the Happy Days School Board, the
state educational agency, or take more serious action by filing a claim in
court.322 Also, Mr. and Mrs. Wilson know that if any future surveys arise
containing invasive material, Happy Days will be required to receive
their consent because the statute now covers surveys both required and
voluntary. More importantly, the Wilsons will not have to worry
whether little Wendy is being asked how she feels about sex or whether
William is being introduced to thoughts of a world with one less race.
Instead, Mr. and Mrs. Wilson will know their children are in school
learning, rather than serving as subjects for researchers, who want to use

For example, all of Happy Days schools will be reviewed after a school year is
complete. If Happy Days Elementary School complied with the PPRA’s provisions, it will
be given federal funds, which it can use during the following year. However, if Happy
Days failed to follow the PPRA, it will be denied the funds outright.
321
For example, when the state agency reviews Happy Days Elementary in June 2004
and determines that it violated the PPRA in that academic year, the school would not
receive the funds for the 2003-2004 year. Nevertheless, it would again be subject to review
in June 2005.
322
See Part I. In Part I, Mr. and Mrs. Wilson did not have the ability to obtain any form of
effective relief for Wendy and William. Now, as a result of the amended statute, Mr. and
Mrs. Wilson will be able to protect their children. See also supra note 307 (illustrating the
requirements of which form of relief can be obtained at what time).
320
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public elementary and secondary classrooms as their personal
laboratories.323
V. ENOUGH IS ENOUGH
Dear Senator Grassley: . . . I think it is wrong that [schools]
are trying to change and monitor our attitudes. I want to go
to school to learn facts and not learn what opinions my school
administration wants me to know. I want to form my own
opinions. I urge Congress to help make sure kids can form
their own opinions.324
Since the Supreme Court’s decisions in Meyer and Pierce, parents
have held a constitutional right to direct the upbringing of their children.
However, for the past few decades, the strength of that right has faded.
Even with the enactment of statutes like the PPRA, parental rights have
almost become extinct, especially in public education.
At one time, children were sent to school to learn the basic skills
necessary to function in society. However, as researchers recognized the
experimentation prospects of a classroom, children ceased being the
students and became targeted as test subjects.325 In 1978, Senator Hatch
recognized the growing problem in the Nation’s public schools and
enacted the PPRA to help combat the problem. However, with each
invasive survey that continues to be administered, another example is
provided of the statute’s ineffectiveness.
For nearly thirty years, the PPRA has failed to be a weapon that
parents need to protect their children against researchers and public
schools that encourage those researchers. Regardless of a survey’s
purported use to society as a whole, parents should be allowed to decide
what is best for their child and for their family. In fact, the Constitution
Phyllis Schafly, President of the organization Eagle Form, asserted in an interview her
disgust with researchers invading schools and conducting surveys by boldly announcing
that “[a]ll you have to do is turn on the TV” to understand that problems exist such as
underage drinking, drugs, and teenage pregnancy. See Archibald, supra note 127.
Therefore, she emphasizes, “[w]hether it’s 55 percent or 58 percent makes no difference,”
the problems still exist, and the surveys are not helping solve anything. Id.
324
140 CONG. REC. 1217-18 (1994) (written statement by Michelle Petersen, concerned
student, to Senator Grassley).
325
See generally 124 CONG. REC. 27,423 (1978). Senator Hatch believed that the problem
with invasive testing in public schools began “when schools started becoming more
concerned with children’s attitudes, beliefs, and emotions rather than providing them with
basic education.” Id.
323
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supports the idea that “[p]arents should have the right to know about
the values and attitudes being taught to their children, as well as the
right to decide who will teach beliefs, values, and attitudes to their
children.”326 If the PPRA is not amended to correct the statute’s
legislative failings, parents will lose their fundamental right to decide
whether or not their children should be subjected to certain noneducational information in the classroom. In the end, parents will be
forced to watch their children become nothing more than “second class
citizens” in their own classrooms.327
Now, imagine Congress recognized the PPRA’s weaknesses and
acted to resolve those issues as proposed in this Note. Hypnotic will no
longer be able to advance its social surveys onto students without first
obtaining parental consent. Thus, Mr. and Mrs. Wilson can finally
protect their children, knowing that if a violation again occurs at Happy
Days, they will be able to seek and obtain relief for themselves, Wendy,
and William. Additionally, the Wilsons have the ability to attain that
relief either through the courts or the state government. In the end, the
proposed statute will not be able to stop Hypnotic from trying to
conduct its experiments in Happy Days schools, but it will stop little
Wendy and William from having to participate if Mr. and Mrs. Wilson
conclude, as their parents, that the material is inappropriate for a
classroom setting. Finally, the PPRA is an enforceable statute.
Beth Garrison*

140 CONG. REC. 1227 (written statement by Cynthia L. Sharretts, concerned parent, to
Senator Grassley).
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Merriken v. Cressman, 364 F. Supp. 913, 919 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (quoting Miller v. Gillis,
315 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Ill. 1969)); see supra note 1.
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go out to Professor Susan Stuart and Samantha Ahuja, for without their guidance, this Note
would never have been possible. Finally, I would like to thank Frank Dale, who not only
inspires me daily, but whose patience and love has made me a better person.
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